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zzh-zzh-zzh and others added 30 commits October 9, 2023 11:30
…when ignore_references is true"

This reverts commit af699fd.
This reverts commit db2516f.

Change-Id: Ia749f1d31aac87b91086b190a96d29311e034117
This reverts commit f50f24e.

Change-Id: I559ff838d9f96f2bd59feab4e5469325871cb8d6
…n kswapd or direct_reclaim"

This reverts commit 1f8f6d5.

Change-Id: Id3343280dab5cc0af9d86183ce295627b0ac1c59
Change-Id: I996c9eb85ade6f4e9f6271c3548f685da5881362
Change-Id: I16807d1ed279da25d71d02c595ead86391327542
Change-Id: If3029cd3f06cd9be74790a0aa753a5bf69079550
Patch series "mm: lru related cleanups", v2.

The cleanups are intended to reduce the verbosity in lru list operations
and make them less error-prone.  A typical example would be how the
patches change __activate_page():

 static void __activate_page(struct page *page, struct lruvec *lruvec)
 {
 	if (!PageActive(page) && !PageUnevictable(page)) {
-		int lru = page_lru_base_type(page);
 		int nr_pages = thp_nr_pages(page);

-		del_page_from_lru_list(page, lruvec, lru);
+		del_page_from_lru_list(page, lruvec);
 		SetPageActive(page);
-		lru += LRU_ACTIVE;
-		add_page_to_lru_list(page, lruvec, lru);
+		add_page_to_lru_list(page, lruvec);
 		trace_mm_lru_activate(page);

There are a few more places like __activate_page() and they are
unnecessarily repetitive in terms of figuring out which list a page should
be added onto or deleted from.  And with the duplicated code removed, they
are easier to read, IMO.

Patch 1 to 5 basically cover the above.  Patch 6 and 7 make code more
robust by improving bug reporting.  Patch 8, 9 and 10 take care of some
dangling helpers left in header files.

This patch (of 10):

There is add_page_to_lru_list(), and move_pages_to_lru() should reuse it,
not duplicate it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 42895ea73bcd37c4a79e4c9f681ab8b82243c7f7)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I7e09be6bedcd451c4e8c790c969306b6ca3adebd
…letion functions

These functions will call page_lru() in the following patches.  Move them
below page_lru() to avoid the forward declaration.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f90d8191ac864df33b1898bc7edc54eaa24e22bc)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I32b8565107c9134e656b43886c00105eb07b34dd
The "enum lru_list" parameter to add_page_to_lru_list() and
add_page_to_lru_list_tail() is redundant in the sense that it can
be extracted from the "struct page" parameter by page_lru().

A caveat is that we need to make sure PageActive() or
PageUnevictable() is correctly set or cleared before calling
these two functions. And they are indeed.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 3a9c9788a3149d9745b7eb2eae811e57ef3b127c)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I0d92b845d18e6ab3bcb5645f22e3cedb04257d98
…tion()

The parameter is redundant in the sense that it can be extracted
from the "struct page" parameter by page_lru() correctly.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 861404536a3af3c39f1b10959a40def3d8efa2dd)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: Ia02c0c65dd427a98ffa39e9dc3e2ae701e85fad8
…list()

The parameter is redundant in the sense that it can be potentially
extracted from the "struct page" parameter by page_lru(). We need to
make sure that existing PageActive() or PageUnevictable() remains
until the function returns. A few places don't conform, and simple
reordering fixes them.

This patch may have left page_off_lru() seemingly odd, and we'll take
care of it in the next patch.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 46ae6b2cc2a47904a368d238425531ea91f3a2a5)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I1e14dcbf4111b39cf155ed3512423448865eb324
Similar to page_off_lru(), the new function does non-atomic clearing
of PageLRU() in addition to PageActive() and PageUnevictable(), on a
page that has no references left.

If PageActive() and PageUnevictable() are both set, refuse to clear
either and leave them to bad_page(). This is a behavior change that
is meant to help debug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 875601796267214f286d3581fe74f2805d060fe8)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I0290916fa08277c50e228a8d3f39af67d62ff9d0
Move scattered VM_BUG_ONs to two essential places that cover all
lru list additions and deletions.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit bc7112719e1e80e4208eef3fc9bd8d2b6c263e7d)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I950ad4171f973c740d9fc3778d44efc020d0e12c
…ts sole caller

We've removed all other references to this function.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alex Shi <[email protected]>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <[email protected]>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit c1770e34f3e7640887d8129fc05d13fe17101301)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: If229fa7a09e5be79cc28dc5a780b900e69f4ce64
We are capable of SetPageWorkingset based on refault distances after
commit aae466b ("mm/swap: implement workingset detection for
anonymous LRU").  This is done by workingset_refault(), which is right
above the unconditional SetPageWorkingset deleted by this patch.

The unconditional SetPageWorkingset miscategorizes pages that are read
ahead or never belonged to the working set (e.g., tmpfs pages accessed
only once by fd).  When those pages are swapped in (after they were
swapped out) for the first time, they skew PSI (when using async swap).
When this happens again, depending on their refault distances, they might
skew workingset_restore_anon counter in addition to PSI because their
shadows indicate they were part of the working set.

Historically, SetPageWorkingset was added as part of the PSI series, and
Johannes said:
 "It was meant to mark incoming pages under IO with SetPageWorkingset
  when waiting for them constituted a memory stall.

  On the page cache side, because we HAVE workingset detection, this was
  specific to recently evicted pages that had been active in their
  previous life. On the anon side, the aging algorithm had no
  distinction between workingset and sporadically used pages. Given the
  choice between a) no swapin stalls are pressure and b) all swapin
  stalls are pressure, I went with the latter in order to detect swap
  storms. The false positive case - high rate of swapin without severe
  memory pressure - was relatively unlikely, because we tried to avoid
  swapping until everything was completely on fire in the first place."

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit cad8320b4b395702e49578580c70026c8271ea88)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: Ifa9c5fa2e875e6ccee6c3f7e2d2983278d54c220
…_CPUPID_WIDTH

The naming convention used in include/linux/page-flags-layout.h:
  *_SHIFT: the number of bits trying to allocate
  *_WIDTH: the number of bits successfully allocated

So when it comes to LAST_CPUPID_WIDTH, we need to check whether all
previous *_WIDTH and LAST_CPUPID_SHIFT can fit into page flags. This
means we need to use NODES_WIDTH, not NODES_SHIFT.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f73c6c8805ed0762d99122d5332fcf42b0c8fbb8)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I6d7c58cf5d10e302adc818ac7e1fd727208d23c8
Tidy things up and delete comments stating the obvious with typos or
making no sense.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1587db62d8c0dbd943752f657b452213e1c4d8d4)
Bug: 227651406
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I1d57992dd4c68d89c1b9180f280e09d5d08482b6
Patch series "Multi-Gen LRU Framework", v14.

What's new
==========
1. OpenWrt, in addition to Android, Arch Linux Zen, Armbian, ChromeOS,
   Liquorix, post-factum and XanMod, is now shipping MGLRU on 5.15.
2. Fixed long-tailed direct reclaim latency seen on high-memory (TBs)
   machines. The old direct reclaim backoff, which tries to enforce a
   minimum fairness among all eligible memcgs, over-swapped by about
   (total_mem>>DEF_PRIORITY)-nr_to_reclaim. The new backoff, which
   pulls the plug on swapping once the target is met, trades some
   fairness for curtailed latency:
   https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
3. Fixed minior build warnings and conflicts. More comments and nits.

TLDR
====
The current page reclaim is too expensive in terms of CPU usage and it
often makes poor choices about what to evict. This patchset offers an
alternative solution that is performant, versatile and
straightforward.

Patchset overview
=================
The design and implementation overview is in patch 14:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

01. mm: x86, arm64: add arch_has_hw_pte_young()
02. mm: x86: add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG
Take advantage of hardware features when trying to clear the accessed
bit in many PTEs.

03. mm/vmscan.c: refactor shrink_node()
04. Revert "include/linux/mm_inline.h: fold __update_lru_size() into
    its sole caller"
Minor refactors to improve readability for the following patches.

05. mm: multi-gen LRU: groundwork
Adds the basic data structure and the functions that insert pages to
and remove pages from the multi-gen LRU (MGLRU) lists.

06. mm: multi-gen LRU: minimal implementation
A minimal implementation without optimizations.

07. mm: multi-gen LRU: exploit locality in rmap
Exploits spatial locality to improve efficiency when using the rmap.

08. mm: multi-gen LRU: support page table walks
Further exploits spatial locality by optionally scanning page tables.

09. mm: multi-gen LRU: optimize multiple memcgs
Optimizes the overall performance for multiple memcgs running mixed
types of workloads.

10. mm: multi-gen LRU: kill switch
Adds a kill switch to enable or disable MGLRU at runtime.

11. mm: multi-gen LRU: thrashing prevention
12. mm: multi-gen LRU: debugfs interface
Provide userspace with features like thrashing prevention, working set
estimation and proactive reclaim.

13. mm: multi-gen LRU: admin guide
14. mm: multi-gen LRU: design doc
Add an admin guide and a design doc.

Benchmark results
=================
Independent lab results
-----------------------
Based on the popularity of searches [01] and the memory usage in
Google's public cloud, the most popular open-source memory-hungry
applications, in alphabetical order, are:
      Apache Cassandra      Memcached
      Apache Hadoop         MongoDB
      Apache Spark          PostgreSQL
      MariaDB (MySQL)       Redis

An independent lab evaluated MGLRU with the most widely used benchmark
suites for the above applications. They posted 960 data points along
with kernel metrics and perf profiles collected over more than 500
hours of total benchmark time. Their final reports show that, with 95%
confidence intervals (CIs), the above applications all performed
significantly better for at least part of their benchmark matrices.

On 5.14:
1. Apache Spark [02] took 95% CIs [9.28, 11.19]% and [12.20, 14.93]%
   less wall time to sort three billion random integers, respectively,
   under the medium- and the high-concurrency conditions, when
   overcommitting memory. There were no statistically significant
   changes in wall time for the rest of the benchmark matrix.
2. MariaDB [03] achieved 95% CIs [5.24, 10.71]% and [20.22, 25.97]%
   more transactions per minute (TPM), respectively, under the medium-
   and the high-concurrency conditions, when overcommitting memory.
   There were no statistically significant changes in TPM for the rest
   of the benchmark matrix.
3. Memcached [04] achieved 95% CIs [23.54, 32.25]%, [20.76, 41.61]%
   and [21.59, 30.02]% more operations per second (OPS), respectively,
   for sequential access, random access and Gaussian (distribution)
   access, when THP=always; 95% CIs [13.85, 15.97]% and
   [23.94, 29.92]% more OPS, respectively, for random access and
   Gaussian access, when THP=never. There were no statistically
   significant changes in OPS for the rest of the benchmark matrix.
4. MongoDB [05] achieved 95% CIs [2.23, 3.44]%, [6.97, 9.73]% and
   [2.16, 3.55]% more operations per second (OPS), respectively, for
   exponential (distribution) access, random access and Zipfian
   (distribution) access, when underutilizing memory; 95% CIs
   [8.83, 10.03]%, [21.12, 23.14]% and [5.53, 6.46]% more OPS,
   respectively, for exponential access, random access and Zipfian
   access, when overcommitting memory.

On 5.15:
5. Apache Cassandra [06] achieved 95% CIs [1.06, 4.10]%, [1.94, 5.43]%
   and [4.11, 7.50]% more operations per second (OPS), respectively,
   for exponential (distribution) access, random access and Zipfian
   (distribution) access, when swap was off; 95% CIs [0.50, 2.60]%,
   [6.51, 8.77]% and [3.29, 6.75]% more OPS, respectively, for
   exponential access, random access and Zipfian access, when swap was
   on.
6. Apache Hadoop [07] took 95% CIs [5.31, 9.69]% and [2.02, 7.86]%
   less average wall time to finish twelve parallel TeraSort jobs,
   respectively, under the medium- and the high-concurrency
   conditions, when swap was on. There were no statistically
   significant changes in average wall time for the rest of the
   benchmark matrix.
7. PostgreSQL [08] achieved 95% CI [1.75, 6.42]% more transactions per
   minute (TPM) under the high-concurrency condition, when swap was
   off; 95% CIs [12.82, 18.69]% and [22.70, 46.86]% more TPM,
   respectively, under the medium- and the high-concurrency
   conditions, when swap was on. There were no statistically
   significant changes in TPM for the rest of the benchmark matrix.
8. Redis [09] achieved 95% CIs [0.58, 5.94]%, [6.55, 14.58]% and
   [11.47, 19.36]% more total operations per second (OPS),
   respectively, for sequential access, random access and Gaussian
   (distribution) access, when THP=always; 95% CIs [1.27, 3.54]%,
   [10.11, 14.81]% and [8.75, 13.64]% more total OPS, respectively,
   for sequential access, random access and Gaussian access, when
   THP=never.

Our lab results
---------------
To supplement the above results, we ran the following benchmark suites
on 5.16-rc7 and found no regressions [10].
      fs_fio_bench_hdd_mq      pft
      fs_lmbench               pgsql-hammerdb
      fs_parallelio            redis
      fs_postmark              stream
      hackbench                sysbenchthread
      kernbench                tpcc_spark
      memcached                unixbench
      multichase               vm-scalability
      mutilate                 will-it-scale
      nginx

[01] https://trends.google.com
[02] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[03] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[04] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[05] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[06] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[07] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[08] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[09] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[10] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Read-world applications
=======================
Third-party testimonials
------------------------
Konstantin reported [11]:
   I have Archlinux with 8G RAM + zswap + swap. While developing, I
   have lots of apps opened such as multiple LSP-servers for different
   langs, chats, two browsers, etc... Usually, my system gets quickly
   to a point of SWAP-storms, where I have to kill LSP-servers,
   restart browsers to free memory, etc, otherwise the system lags
   heavily and is barely usable.

   1.5 day ago I migrated from 5.11.15 kernel to 5.12 + the LRU
   patchset, and I started up by opening lots of apps to create memory
   pressure, and worked for a day like this. Till now I had not a
   single SWAP-storm, and mind you I got 3.4G in SWAP. I was never
   getting to the point of 3G in SWAP before without a single
   SWAP-storm.

Vaibhav from IBM reported [12]:
   In a synthetic MongoDB Benchmark, seeing an average of ~19%
   throughput improvement on POWER10(Radix MMU + 64K Page Size) with
   MGLRU patches on top of 5.16 kernel for MongoDB + YCSB across
   three different request distributions, namely, Exponential, Uniform
   and Zipfan.

Shuang from U of Rochester reported [13]:
   With the MGLRU, fio achieved 95% CIs [38.95, 40.26]%, [4.12, 6.64]%
   and [9.26, 10.36]% higher throughput, respectively, for random
   access, Zipfian (distribution) access and Gaussian (distribution)
   access, when the average number of jobs per CPU is 1; 95% CIs
   [42.32, 49.15]%, [9.44, 9.89]% and [20.99, 22.86]% higher
   throughput, respectively, for random access, Zipfian access and
   Gaussian access, when the average number of jobs per CPU is 2.

Daniel from Michigan Tech reported [14]:
   With Memcached allocating ~100GB of byte-addressable Optante,
   performance improvement in terms of throughput (measured as queries
   per second) was about 10% for a series of workloads.

Large-scale deployments
-----------------------
We've rolled out MGLRU to tens of millions of ChromeOS users and
about a million Android users. Google's fleetwide profiling [15] shows
an overall 40% decrease in kswapd CPU usage, in addition to
improvements in other UX metrics, e.g., an 85% decrease in the number
of low-memory kills at the 75th percentile and an 18% decrease in
app launch time at the 50th percentile.

The downstream kernels that have been using MGLRU include:
1. Android [16]
2. Arch Linux Zen [17]
3. Armbian [18]
4. ChromeOS [19]
5. Liquorix [20]
6. OpenWrt [21]
7. post-factum [22]
8. XanMod [23]

[11] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[12] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[13] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[14] https://lore.kernel.org/r/CA+4-3vksGvKd18FgRinxhqHetBS1hQekJE2gwco8Ja-bJWKtFw@mail.gmail.com/
[15] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2749469.2750392
[16] https://android.com
[17] https://archlinux.org
[18] https://armbian.com
[19] https://chromium.org
[20] https://liquorix.net
[21] https://openwrt.org
[22] https://codeberg.org/pf-kernel
[23] https://xanmod.org

Summary
=======
The facts are:
1. The independent lab results and the real-world applications
   indicate substantial improvements; there are no known regressions.
2. Thrashing prevention, working set estimation and proactive reclaim
   work out of the box; there are no equivalent solutions.
3. There is a lot of new code; no smaller changes have been
   demonstrated similar effects.

Our options, accordingly, are:
1. Given the amount of evidence, the reported improvements will likely
   materialize for a wide range of workloads.
2. Gauging the interest from the past discussions, the new features
   will likely be put to use for both personal computers and data
   centers.
3. Based on Google's track record, the new code will likely be well
   maintained in the long term. It'd be more difficult if not
   impossible to achieve similar effects with other approaches.

This patch (of 14):

Some architectures automatically set the accessed bit in PTEs, e.g., x86
and arm64 v8.2.  On architectures that do not have this capability,
clearing the accessed bit in a PTE usually triggers a page fault following
the TLB miss of this PTE (to emulate the accessed bit).

Being aware of this capability can help make better decisions, e.g.,
whether to spread the work out over a period of time to reduce bursty page
faults when trying to clear the accessed bit in many PTEs.

Note that theoretically this capability can be unreliable, e.g.,
hotplugged CPUs might be different from builtin ones.  Therefore it should
not be used in architecture-independent code that involves correctness,
e.g., to determine whether TLB flushes are required (in combination with
the accessed bit).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Change-Id: I7c94aa3ffeb0a8e570c2d7db15183f87658d0141
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Barrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Donald Carr <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Larabel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit e1fd09e3d1dd4a1a8b3b33bc1fd647eee9f4e475)
[Kalesh Singh - Fix trivial conflict in arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h]
Bug: 249601646
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Some architectures support the accessed bit in non-leaf PMD entries, e.g.,
x86 sets the accessed bit in a non-leaf PMD entry when using it as part of
linear address translation [1].  Page table walkers that clear the
accessed bit may use this capability to reduce their search space.

Note that:
1. Although an inline function is preferable, this capability is added
   as a configuration option for consistency with the existing macros.
2. Due to the little interest in other varieties, this capability was
   only tested on Intel and AMD CPUs.

Thanks to the following developers for their efforts [2][3].
  Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
  Stephen Rothwell <[email protected]>

[1]: Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual
     Volume 3 (June 2021), section 4.8
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Change-Id: Iccf98138153b8d466c393232df80187dd3687036
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Barrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Donald Carr <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Larabel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit eed9a328aa1ae6ac1edaa026957e6882f57de0dd)
[Kalesh Singh - Fix trivial conflict in arch/Kconfig]
Bug: 249601646
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
This patch refactors shrink_node() to improve readability for the upcoming
changes to mm/vmscan.c.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Change-Id: I5a5b7c679e496526adbc4f7d8c4968f4dfd9cf90
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Barrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Donald Carr <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Larabel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f1e1a7be4718609042e3285bc2110d74825ad9d1)
[Kalesh Singh - Fix conflicts in mm/vmscan.c]
Bug: 249601646
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Evictable pages are divided into multiple generations for each lruvec.
The youngest generation number is stored in lrugen->max_seq for both
anon and file types as they are aged on an equal footing. The oldest
generation numbers are stored in lrugen->min_seq[] separately for anon
and file types as clean file pages can be evicted regardless of swap
constraints. These three variables are monotonically increasing.

Generation numbers are truncated into order_base_2(MAX_NR_GENS+1) bits
in order to fit into the gen counter in page->flags. Each truncated
generation number is an index to lrugen->lists[]. The sliding window
technique is used to track at least MIN_NR_GENS and at most
MAX_NR_GENS generations. The gen counter stores a value within [1,
MAX_NR_GENS] while a page is on one of lrugen->lists[]. Otherwise it
stores 0.

There are two conceptually independent procedures: "the aging", which
produces young generations, and "the eviction", which consumes old
generations.  They form a closed-loop system, i.e., "the page reclaim".
Both procedures can be invoked from userspace for the purposes of working
set estimation and proactive reclaim.  These techniques are commonly used
to optimize job scheduling (bin packing) in data centers [1][2].

To avoid confusion, the terms "hot" and "cold" will be applied to the
multi-gen LRU, as a new convention; the terms "active" and "inactive" will
be applied to the active/inactive LRU, as usual.

The protection of hot pages and the selection of cold pages are based
on page access channels and patterns. There are two access channels:
one through page tables and the other through file descriptors. The
protection of the former channel is by design stronger because:
1. The uncertainty in determining the access patterns of the former
   channel is higher due to the approximation of the accessed bit.
2. The cost of evicting the former channel is higher due to the TLB
   flushes required and the likelihood of encountering the dirty bit.
3. The penalty of underprotecting the former channel is higher because
   applications usually do not prepare themselves for major page
   faults like they do for blocked I/O. E.g., GUI applications
   commonly use dedicated I/O threads to avoid blocking rendering
   threads.

There are also two access patterns: one with temporal locality and the
other without.  For the reasons listed above, the former channel is
assumed to follow the former pattern unless VM_SEQ_READ or VM_RAND_READ is
present; the latter channel is assumed to follow the latter pattern unless
outlying refaults have been observed [3][4].

The next patch will address the "outlying refaults".  Three macros, i.e.,
LRU_REFS_WIDTH, LRU_REFS_PGOFF and LRU_REFS_MASK, used later are added in
this patch to make the entire patchset less diffy.

A page is added to the youngest generation on faulting.  The aging needs
to check the accessed bit at least twice before handing this page over to
the eviction.  The first check takes care of the accessed bit set on the
initial fault; the second check makes sure this page has not been used
since then.  This protocol, AKA second chance, requires a minimum of two
generations, hence MIN_NR_GENS.

[1] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3297858.3304053
[2] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3503222.3507731
[3] https://lwn.net/Articles/495543/
[4] https://lwn.net/Articles/815342/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Change-Id: I7b24d1e9d263e4eb2c2ee23f2eb143824fcb5201
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Barrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Donald Carr <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Larabel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit ec1c86b25f4bdd9dce6436c0539d2a6ae676e1c4)
[ Resolve conflicts in mm/memory.c, mm/memcontrol.c, mm/Kconfig,
include/linux/mm_inline.h]
Bug: 249601646
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
To avoid confusion, the terms "promotion" and "demotion" will be applied
to the multi-gen LRU, as a new convention; the terms "activation" and
"deactivation" will be applied to the active/inactive LRU, as usual.

The aging produces young generations.  Given an lruvec, it increments
max_seq when max_seq-min_seq+1 approaches MIN_NR_GENS.  The aging promotes
hot pages to the youngest generation when it finds them accessed through
page tables; the demotion of cold pages happens consequently when it
increments max_seq.  Promotion in the aging path does not involve any LRU
list operations, only the updates of the gen counter and
lrugen->nr_pages[]; demotion, unless as the result of the increment of
max_seq, requires LRU list operations, e.g., lru_deactivate_fn().  The
aging has the complexity O(nr_hot_pages), since it is only interested in
hot pages.

The eviction consumes old generations.  Given an lruvec, it increments
min_seq when lrugen->lists[] indexed by min_seq%MAX_NR_GENS becomes empty.
A feedback loop modeled after the PID controller monitors refaults over
anon and file types and decides which type to evict when both types are
available from the same generation.

The protection of pages accessed multiple times through file descriptors
takes place in the eviction path.  Each generation is divided into
multiple tiers.  A page accessed N times through file descriptors is in
tier order_base_2(N).  Tiers do not have dedicated lrugen->lists[], only
bits in page->flags.  The aforementioned feedback loop also monitors
refaults over all tiers and decides when to protect pages in which tiers
(N>1), using the first tier (N=0,1) as a baseline.  The first tier
contains single-use unmapped clean pages, which are most likely the best
choices.  In contrast to promotion in the aging path, the protection of a
page in the eviction path is achieved by moving this page to the next
generation, i.e., min_seq+1, if the feedback loop decides so.  This
approach has the following advantages:

1. It removes the cost of activation in the buffered access path by
   inferring whether pages accessed multiple times through file
   descriptors are statistically hot and thus worth protecting in the
   eviction path.
2. It takes pages accessed through page tables into account and avoids
   overprotecting pages accessed multiple times through file
   descriptors. (Pages accessed through page tables are in the first
   tier, since N=0.)
3. More tiers provide better protection for pages accessed more than
   twice through file descriptors, when under heavy buffered I/O
   workloads.

Server benchmark results:
  Single workload:
    fio (buffered I/O): +[30, 32]%
                IOPS         BW
      5.19-rc1: 2673k        10.2GiB/s
      patch1-6: 3491k        13.3GiB/s

  Single workload:
    memcached (anon): -[4, 6]%
                Ops/sec      KB/sec
      5.19-rc1: 1161501.04   45177.25
      patch1-6: 1106168.46   43025.04

  Configurations:
    CPU: two Xeon 6154
    Mem: total 256G

    Node 1 was only used as a ram disk to reduce the variance in the
    results.

    patch drivers/block/brd.c <<EOF
    99,100c99,100
    < 	gfp_flags = GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_HIGHMEM;
    < 	page = alloc_page(gfp_flags);
    ---
    > 	gfp_flags = GFP_NOIO | __GFP_ZERO | __GFP_HIGHMEM | __GFP_THISNODE;
    > 	page = alloc_pages_node(1, gfp_flags, 0);
    EOF

    cat >>/etc/systemd/system.conf <<EOF
    CPUAffinity=numa
    NUMAPolicy=bind
    NUMAMask=0
    EOF

    cat >>/etc/memcached.conf <<EOF
    -m 184320
    -s /var/run/memcached/memcached.sock
    -a 0766
    -t 36
    -B binary
    EOF

    cat fio.sh
    modprobe brd rd_nr=1 rd_size=113246208
    swapoff -a
    mkfs.ext4 /dev/ram0
    mount -t ext4 /dev/ram0 /mnt

    mkdir /sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/test
    echo 38654705664 >/sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/test/memory.max
    echo $$ >/sys/fs/cgroup/user.slice/test/cgroup.procs
    fio -name=mglru --numjobs=72 --directory=/mnt --size=1408m \
      --buffered=1 --ioengine=io_uring --iodepth=128 \
      --iodepth_batch_submit=32 --iodepth_batch_complete=32 \
      --rw=randread --random_distribution=random --norandommap \
      --time_based --ramp_time=10m --runtime=5m --group_reporting

    cat memcached.sh
    modprobe brd rd_nr=1 rd_size=113246208
    swapoff -a
    mkswap /dev/ram0
    swapon /dev/ram0

    memtier_benchmark -S /var/run/memcached/memcached.sock \
      -P memcache_binary -n allkeys --key-minimum=1 \
      --key-maximum=65000000 --key-pattern=P:P -c 1 -t 36 \
      --ratio 1:0 --pipeline 8 -d 2000

    memtier_benchmark -S /var/run/memcached/memcached.sock \
      -P memcache_binary -n allkeys --key-minimum=1 \
      --key-maximum=65000000 --key-pattern=R:R -c 1 -t 36 \
      --ratio 0:1 --pipeline 8 --randomize --distinct-client-seed

Client benchmark results:
  kswapd profiles:
    5.19-rc1
      40.33%  page_vma_mapped_walk (overhead)
      21.80%  lzo1x_1_do_compress (real work)
       7.53%  do_raw_spin_lock
       3.95%  _raw_spin_unlock_irq
       2.52%  vma_interval_tree_iter_next
       2.37%  page_referenced_one
       2.28%  vma_interval_tree_subtree_search
       1.97%  anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_first
       1.60%  ptep_clear_flush
       1.06%  __zram_bvec_write

    patch1-6
      39.03%  lzo1x_1_do_compress (real work)
      18.47%  page_vma_mapped_walk (overhead)
       6.74%  _raw_spin_unlock_irq
       3.97%  do_raw_spin_lock
       2.49%  ptep_clear_flush
       2.48%  anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_first
       1.92%  page_referenced_one
       1.88%  __zram_bvec_write
       1.48%  memmove
       1.31%  vma_interval_tree_iter_next

  Configurations:
    CPU: single Snapdragon 7c
    Mem: total 4G

    ChromeOS MemoryPressure [1]

[1] https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/platform/tast-tests/

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Change-Id: I30b26b3086ce1879b83b96eb265f8f0dcb16a1fb
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Barrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Donald Carr <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Larabel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit ac35a490237446b71e3b4b782b1596967edd0aa8)
[Resolve confilcts in mm/Kconfig, mm/swap.c, mm/vmscan.c
 Remove isolation race check in isolate_page() - TestClearPageLRU()
 not available in 5.10 ]
Bug: 249601646
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
Searching the rmap for PTEs mapping each page on an LRU list (to test and
clear the accessed bit) can be expensive because pages from different VMAs
(PA space) are not cache friendly to the rmap (VA space).  For workloads
mostly using mapped pages, searching the rmap can incur the highest CPU
cost in the reclaim path.

This patch exploits spatial locality to reduce the trips into the rmap.
When shrink_page_list() walks the rmap and finds a young PTE, a new
function lru_gen_look_around() scans at most BITS_PER_LONG-1 adjacent
PTEs.  On finding another young PTE, it clears the accessed bit and
updates the gen counter of the page mapped by this PTE to
(max_seq%MAX_NR_GENS)+1.

Server benchmark results:
  Single workload:
    fio (buffered I/O): no change

  Single workload:
    memcached (anon): +[3, 5]%
                Ops/sec      KB/sec
      patch1-6: 1106168.46   43025.04
      patch1-7: 1147696.57   44640.29

  Configurations:
    no change

Client benchmark results:
  kswapd profiles:
    patch1-6
      39.03%  lzo1x_1_do_compress (real work)
      18.47%  page_vma_mapped_walk (overhead)
       6.74%  _raw_spin_unlock_irq
       3.97%  do_raw_spin_lock
       2.49%  ptep_clear_flush
       2.48%  anon_vma_interval_tree_iter_first
       1.92%  page_referenced_one
       1.88%  __zram_bvec_write
       1.48%  memmove
       1.31%  vma_interval_tree_iter_next

    patch1-7
      48.16%  lzo1x_1_do_compress (real work)
       8.20%  page_vma_mapped_walk (overhead)
       7.06%  _raw_spin_unlock_irq
       2.92%  ptep_clear_flush
       2.53%  __zram_bvec_write
       2.11%  do_raw_spin_lock
       2.02%  memmove
       1.93%  lru_gen_look_around
       1.56%  free_unref_page_list
       1.40%  memset

  Configurations:
    no change

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Change-Id: Iac405b6d42e2e3f632b6748368f61202c164f1ad
Signed-off-by: Yu Zhao <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Barry Song <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Brian Geffon <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Jan Alexander Steffens (heftig) <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oleksandr Natalenko <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Steven Barrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Suleiman Souhlal <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Byrne <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Donald Carr <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Konstantin Kharlamov <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shuang Zhai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Sofia Trinh <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Vaibhav Jain <[email protected]>
Cc: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Cc: Hillf Danton <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <[email protected]>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
Cc: Mel Gorman <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Michael Larabel <[email protected]>
Cc: Michal Hocko <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Qi Zheng <[email protected]>
Cc: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <[email protected]>
Cc: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 018ee47f14893d500131dfca2ff9f3ff8ebd4ed2)
Bug: 249601646
Signed-off-by: Kalesh Singh <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit f1aff4bc199cb92c055668caed65505e3b4d2656 upstream.

The blammed commit copied to argv the size of the reallocated argv,
instead of the size of the old_argv, thus reading and copying from
past the old_argv allocated memory.

Following BUG_ON was hit:
[    3.038929][    T1] kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1040!
[    3.039147][    T1] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1]  SMP
...
[    3.056489][    T1] Call trace:
[    3.056591][    T1]  __fortify_panic+0x10/0x18 (P)
[    3.056773][    T1]  dm_split_args+0x20c/0x210
[    3.056942][    T1]  dm_table_add_target+0x13c/0x360
[    3.057132][    T1]  table_load+0x110/0x3ac
[    3.057292][    T1]  dm_ctl_ioctl+0x424/0x56c
[    3.057457][    T1]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
[    3.057634][    T1]  invoke_syscall+0x58/0x10c
[    3.057804][    T1]  el0_svc_common+0xa8/0xdc
[    3.057970][    T1]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[    3.058123][    T1]  el0_svc+0x50/0xac
[    3.058266][    T1]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x60/0xc4
[    3.058452][    T1]  el0t_64_sync+0x1b0/0x1b4
[    3.058620][    T1] Code: f800865e a9bf7bfd 910003fd 941f48aa (d4210000)
[    3.058897][    T1] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    3.059083][    T1] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception

Fix it by copying the size of src, and not the size of dst, as it was.

Fixes: 5a2a6c428190 ("dm: always update the array size in realloc_argv on success")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit c457dc1ec770a22636b473ce5d35614adfe97636 ]

When memory is insufficient, the allocation of nfs_lock_context in
nfs_get_lock_context() fails and returns -ENOMEM. If we mistakenly treat
an nfs4_unlockdata structure (whose l_ctx member has been set to -ENOMEM)
as valid and proceed to execute rpc_run_task(), this will trigger a NULL
pointer dereference in nfs4_locku_prepare. For example:

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 15 UID: 0 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u64:0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-dirty #60
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40
Workqueue: rpciod rpc_async_schedule
RIP: 0010:nfs4_locku_prepare+0x35/0xc2
Code: 89 f2 48 89 fd 48 c7 c7 68 69 ef b5 53 48 8b 8e 90 00 00 00 48 89 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffbbafc006bdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 000000000000004b RBX: ffff9b964fc1fa00 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: fffffffffffffff4 RDI: ffff9ba53fddbf40
RBP: ffff9ba539934000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffbbafc006bc38
R10: ffffffffb6b689c8 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff9ba539934030
R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000004248060 R15: ffffffffb56d1c30
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ba5881f0000(0000) knlGS:00000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000000000000c CR3: 000000093f244000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __rpc_execute+0xbc/0x480
 rpc_async_schedule+0x2f/0x40
 process_one_work+0x232/0x5d0
 worker_thread+0x1da/0x3d0
 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
 kthread+0x10d/0x240
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:
CR2: 000000000000000c
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Free the allocated nfs4_unlockdata when nfs_get_lock_context() fails and
return NULL to terminate subsequent rpc_run_task, preventing NULL pointer
dereference.

Fixes: f30cb75 ("NFS: Always wait for I/O completion before unlock")
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit d7442f512b71fc63a99c8a801422dde4fbbf9f93 upstream.

The CI testing bots triggered the following splat:

[  718.203054] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[  718.206349] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881bd127e00 by task sh/20834
[  718.212852] CPU: 28 PID: 20834 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S      W IOE     5.17.0-rc8_nextqueue-devqueue-02643-g23f3121aca93 #1
[  718.219695] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0012.070720200218 07/07/2020
[  718.223418] Call Trace:
[  718.227139]
[  718.230783]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[  718.234431]  print_address_description.constprop.9+0x21/0x170
[  718.238177]  ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[  718.241885]  ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[  718.245539]  kasan_report.cold.18+0x7f/0x11b
[  718.249197]  ? free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[  718.252852]  free_irq_cpu_rmap+0x53/0x80
[  718.256471]  ice_free_cpu_rx_rmap.part.11+0x37/0x50 [ice]
[  718.260174]  ice_remove_arfs+0x5f/0x70 [ice]
[  718.263810]  ice_rebuild_arfs+0x3b/0x70 [ice]
[  718.267419]  ice_rebuild+0x39c/0xb60 [ice]
[  718.270974]  ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
[  718.274472]  ? ice_init_phy_user_cfg+0x360/0x360 [ice]
[  718.278033]  ? delay_tsc+0x4a/0xb0
[  718.281513]  ? preempt_count_sub+0x14/0xc0
[  718.284984]  ? delay_tsc+0x8f/0xb0
[  718.288463]  ice_do_reset+0x92/0xf0 [ice]
[  718.292014]  ice_pci_err_resume+0x91/0xf0 [ice]
[  718.295561]  pci_reset_function+0x53/0x80
<...>
[  718.393035] Allocated by task 690:
[  718.433497] Freed by task 20834:
[  718.495688] Last potentially related work creation:
[  718.568966] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881bd127e00
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96
[  718.574085] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                96-byte region [ffff8881bd127e00, ffff8881bd127e60)
[  718.579265] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  718.598905] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  718.601809]  ffff8881bd127d00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
[  718.604796]  ffff8881bd127d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  718.607794] >ffff8881bd127e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc
[  718.610811]                    ^
[  718.613819]  ffff8881bd127e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc
[  718.617107]  ffff8881bd127f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc

This is due to that free_irq_cpu_rmap() is always being called
*after* (devm_)free_irq() and thus it tries to work with IRQ descs
already freed. For example, on device reset the driver frees the
rmap right before allocating a new one (the splat above).
Make rmap creation and freeing function symmetrical with
{request,free}_irq() calls i.e. do that on ifup/ifdown instead
of device probe/remove/resume. These operations can be performed
independently from the actual device aRFS configuration.
Also, make sure ice_vsi_free_irq() clears IRQ affinity notifiers
only when aRFS is disabled -- otherwise, CPU rmap sets and clears
its own and they must not be touched manually.

Fixes: 28bf267 ("ice: Implement aRFS")
Co-developed-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ivan Vecera <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Suraj Jitindar Singh <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit ef1d3455bbc1922f94a91ed58d3d7db440652959 ]

If a faulty CXL memory device returns a broken zero LSA size in its
memory device information (Identify Memory Device (Opcode 4000h), CXL
spec. 3.1, 8.2.9.9.1.1), a divide error occurs in the libnvdimm
driver:

 Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 RIP: 0010:nd_label_data_init+0x10e/0x800 [libnvdimm]

Code and flow:

1) CXL Command 4000h returns LSA size = 0
2) config_size is assigned to zero LSA size (CXL pmem driver):

drivers/cxl/pmem.c:             .config_size = mds->lsa_size,

3) max_xfer is set to zero (nvdimm driver):

drivers/nvdimm/label.c: max_xfer = min_t(size_t, ndd->nsarea.max_xfer, config_size);

4) A subsequent DIV_ROUND_UP() causes a division by zero:

drivers/nvdimm/label.c: /* Make our initial read size a multiple of max_xfer size */
drivers/nvdimm/label.c: read_size = min(DIV_ROUND_UP(read_size, max_xfer) * max_xfer,
drivers/nvdimm/label.c-                 config_size);

Fix this by checking the config size parameter by extending an
existing check.

Signed-off-by: Robert Richter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 5da692e2262b8f81993baa9592f57d12c2703dea ]

A cache device failing to resume due to mapping errors should not be
retried, as the failure leaves a partially initialized policy object.
Repeating the resume operation risks triggering BUG_ON when reloading
cache mappings into the incomplete policy object.

Reproduce steps:

1. create a cache metadata consisting of 512 or more cache blocks,
   with some mappings stored in the first array block of the mapping
   array. Here we use cache_restore v1.0 to build the metadata.

cat <<EOF >> cmeta.xml
<superblock uuid="" block_size="128" nr_cache_blocks="512" \
policy="smq" hint_width="4">
  <mappings>
    <mapping cache_block="0" origin_block="0" dirty="false"/>
  </mappings>
</superblock>
EOF
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
cache_restore -i cmeta.xml -o /dev/mapper/cmeta --metadata-version=2
dmsetup remove cmeta

2. wipe the second array block of the mapping array to simulate
   data degradations.

mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \
2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"')
ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \
2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"')
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock

3. try bringing up the cache device. The resume is expected to fail
   due to the broken array block.

dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc 262144"
dmsetup create cache --notable
dmsetup load cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"
dmsetup resume cache

4. try resuming the cache again. An unexpected BUG_ON is triggered
   while loading cache mappings.

dmsetup resume cache

Kernel logs:

(snip)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-cache-policy-smq.c:752!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dmsetup Not tainted 6.13.4 #3
RIP: 0010:smq_load_mapping+0x3e5/0x570

Fix by disallowing resume operations for devices that failed the
initial attempt.

Signed-off-by: Ming-Hung Tsai <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1b9366c601039d60546794c63fbb83ce8e53b978 ]

If waiting for gpu reset done in KFD release_work, thers is WARNING:
possible circular locking dependency detected

  #2  kfd_create_process
        kfd_process_mutex
          flush kfd release work

  #1  kfd release work
        wait for amdgpu reset work

  #0  amdgpu_device_gpu_reset
        kgd2kfd_pre_reset
          kfd_process_mutex

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock((work_completion)(&p->release_work));
                  lock((wq_completion)kfd_process_wq);
                  lock((work_completion)(&p->release_work));
   lock((wq_completion)amdgpu-reset-dev);

To fix this, KFD create process move flush release work outside
kfd_process_mutex.

Signed-off-by: Philip Yang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Felix Kuehling <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 46d22b47df2741996af277a2838b95f130436c13 ]

queue->state_change is set as part of nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock(), but if
the TCP connection isn't established when nvmet_tcp_set_queue_sock() is
called then queue->state_change isn't set and sock->sk->sk_state_change
isn't replaced.

As such we don't need to restore sock->sk->sk_state_change if
queue->state_change is NULL.

This avoids NULL pointer dereferences such as this:

[  286.462026][    C0] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[  286.462814][    C0] #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode
[  286.463796][    C0] #PF: error_code(0x0010) - not-present page
[  286.464392][    C0] PGD 8000000140620067 P4D 8000000140620067 PUD 114201067 PMD 0
[  286.465086][    C0] Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[  286.465559][    C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1628 Comm: nvme Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2+ #11 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[  286.466393][    C0] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
[  286.467147][    C0] RIP: 0010:0x0
[  286.467420][    C0] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
[  286.467977][    C0] RSP: 0018:ffff8883ae008580 EFLAGS: 00010246
[  286.468425][    C0] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88813fd34100 RCX: ffffffffa386cc43
[  286.469019][    C0] RDX: 1ffff11027fa68b6 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff88813fd34100
[  286.469545][    C0] RBP: ffff88813fd34160 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed1027fa682c
[  286.470072][    C0] R10: ffff88813fd34167 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88813fd344c3
[  286.470585][    C0] R13: ffff88813fd34112 R14: ffff88813fd34aec R15: ffff888132cdd268
[  286.471070][    C0] FS:  00007fe3c04c7d80(0000) GS:ffff88840743f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  286.471644][    C0] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  286.472543][    C0] CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000012daca000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[  286.473500][    C0] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  286.474467][    C0] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  286.475453][    C0] Call Trace:
[  286.476102][    C0]  <IRQ>
[  286.476719][    C0]  tcp_fin+0x2bb/0x440
[  286.477429][    C0]  tcp_data_queue+0x190f/0x4e60
[  286.478174][    C0]  ? __build_skb_around+0x234/0x330
[  286.478940][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.479659][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_data_queue+0x10/0x10
[  286.480431][    C0]  ? tcp_try_undo_loss+0x640/0x6c0
[  286.481196][    C0]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[  286.482046][    C0]  ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x30
[  286.482769][    C0]  ? ktime_get+0x66/0x150
[  286.483433][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.484146][    C0]  tcp_rcv_established+0x6e4/0x2050
[  286.484857][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.485523][    C0]  ? ipv4_dst_check+0x160/0x2b0
[  286.486203][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_rcv_established+0x10/0x10
[  286.486917][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.487595][    C0]  tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x4d6/0x9b0
[  286.488279][    C0]  tcp_v4_rcv+0x2af8/0x3e30
[  286.488904][    C0]  ? raw_local_deliver+0x51b/0xad0
[  286.489551][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.490198][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_v4_rcv+0x10/0x10
[  286.490813][    C0]  ? __pfx_raw_local_deliver+0x10/0x10
[  286.491487][    C0]  ? __pfx_nf_confirm+0x10/0x10 [nf_conntrack]
[  286.492275][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.492900][    C0]  ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x8f/0x370
[  286.493579][    C0]  ip_local_deliver_finish+0x297/0x420
[  286.494268][    C0]  ip_local_deliver+0x168/0x430
[  286.494867][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver+0x10/0x10
[  286.495498][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10/0x10
[  286.496204][    C0]  ? ip_rcv_finish_core+0x19a/0x1f20
[  286.496806][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.497414][    C0]  ip_rcv+0x455/0x6e0
[  286.497945][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[  286.498550][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.499137][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv_finish+0x10/0x10
[  286.499763][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.500327][    C0]  ? dl_scaled_delta_exec+0xd1/0x2c0
[  286.500922][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
[  286.501480][    C0]  __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x166/0x1b0
[  286.502173][    C0]  ? __pfx___netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x10/0x10
[  286.502903][    C0]  ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310
[  286.503487][    C0]  ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350
[  286.504087][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.504642][    C0]  process_backlog+0x3b9/0x1350
[  286.505214][    C0]  ? process_backlog+0x372/0x1350
[  286.505779][    C0]  __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa6/0x490
[  286.506363][    C0]  net_rx_action+0x92e/0xe10
[  286.506889][    C0]  ? __pfx_net_rx_action+0x10/0x10
[  286.507437][    C0]  ? timerqueue_add+0x1f0/0x320
[  286.507977][    C0]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x68/0x540
[  286.508492][    C0]  ? lock_acquire+0x2b2/0x310
[  286.509043][    C0]  ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
[  286.509607][    C0]  ? handle_softirqs+0x1aa/0x7d0
[  286.510187][    C0]  handle_softirqs+0x1f2/0x7d0
[  286.510754][    C0]  ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10
[  286.511348][    C0]  ? irqtime_account_irq+0x181/0x290
[  286.511937][    C0]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450
[  286.512510][    C0]  do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0
[  286.513100][    C0]  </IRQ>
[  286.513548][    C0]  <TASK>
[  286.513953][    C0]  __local_bh_enable_ip+0x112/0x140
[  286.514522][    C0]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x85d/0x3450
[  286.515072][    C0]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x872/0x3450
[  286.515619][    C0]  ? nft_do_chain+0xe16/0x15b0 [nf_tables]
[  286.516252][    C0]  ? __pfx___dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x10
[  286.516817][    C0]  ? selinux_ip_postroute+0x43c/0xc50
[  286.517433][    C0]  ? __pfx_selinux_ip_postroute+0x10/0x10
[  286.518061][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.518606][    C0]  ? ip_output+0x164/0x4a0
[  286.519149][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.519671][    C0]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x17d5/0x1fb0
[  286.520258][    C0]  ip_finish_output2+0xb4b/0x1fb0
[  286.520787][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output2+0x10/0x10
[  286.521355][    C0]  ? __ip_finish_output+0x15d/0x750
[  286.521890][    C0]  ip_output+0x164/0x4a0
[  286.522372][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_output+0x10/0x10
[  286.522872][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.523402][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60
[  286.524031][    C0]  ? __pfx_ip_finish_output+0x10/0x10
[  286.524605][    C0]  ? __ip_queue_xmit+0x999/0x2260
[  286.525200][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.525744][    C0]  ? ipv4_dst_check+0x16a/0x2b0
[  286.526279][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.526793][    C0]  __ip_queue_xmit+0x1883/0x2260
[  286.527324][    C0]  ? __skb_clone+0x54c/0x730
[  286.527827][    C0]  __tcp_transmit_skb+0x209b/0x37a0
[  286.528374][    C0]  ? __pfx___tcp_transmit_skb+0x10/0x10
[  286.528952][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.529472][    C0]  ? seqcount_lockdep_reader_access.constprop.0+0x82/0x90
[  286.530152][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120
[  286.530691][    C0]  tcp_write_xmit+0xb81/0x88b0
[  286.531224][    C0]  ? mod_memcg_state+0x4d/0x60
[  286.531736][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.532253][    C0]  __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x90/0x320
[  286.532826][    C0]  tcp_send_fin+0x141/0xb50
[  286.533352][    C0]  ? __pfx_tcp_send_fin+0x10/0x10
[  286.533908][    C0]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xab/0x140
[  286.534495][    C0]  inet_shutdown+0x243/0x320
[  286.535077][    C0]  nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0xb3b/0x2590 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.535709][    C0]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260
[  286.536314][    C0]  ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_alloc_queue+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.536996][    C0]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x54/0x1e0
[  286.537550][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x50
[  286.538127][    C0]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x260
[  286.538664][    C0]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  286.539249][    C0]  ? nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.539892][    C0]  ? __wake_up+0x40/0x60
[  286.540392][    C0]  nvme_tcp_alloc_admin_queue+0xd5/0x340 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.541047][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.541589][    C0]  nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x8b/0x7a0 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.542254][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60
[  286.542887][    C0]  ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_setup_ctrl+0x10/0x10 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.543568][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x12/0x120
[  286.544166][    C0]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60
[  286.544792][    C0]  ? nvme_change_ctrl_state+0x196/0x2e0 [nvme_core]
[  286.545477][    C0]  nvme_tcp_create_ctrl+0x839/0xb90 [nvme_tcp]
[  286.546126][    C0]  nvmf_dev_write+0x3db/0x7e0 [nvme_fabrics]
[  286.546775][    C0]  ? rw_verify_area+0x69/0x520
[  286.547334][    C0]  vfs_write+0x218/0xe90
[  286.547854][    C0]  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190
[  286.548408][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.549037][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280
[  286.549659][    C0]  ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10
[  286.550259][    C0]  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x190
[  286.550840][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x8e/0x280
[  286.551516][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.552180][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280
[  286.552834][    C0]  ? ksys_read+0xf5/0x1c0
[  286.553386][    C0]  ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
[  286.553964][    C0]  ksys_write+0xf5/0x1c0
[  286.554499][    C0]  ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10
[  286.555072][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.555698][    C0]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x93/0x280
[  286.556319][    C0]  ? do_syscall_64+0x54/0x190
[  286.556866][    C0]  do_syscall_64+0x93/0x190
[  286.557420][    C0]  ? rcu_read_unlock+0x17/0x60
[  286.557986][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.558526][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.559087][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.559659][    C0]  ? count_memcg_events.constprop.0+0x4a/0x60
[  286.560476][    C0]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7a/0x110
[  286.561064][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.561647][    C0]  ? lock_release+0x217/0x2c0
[  286.562257][    C0]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x171/0xa00
[  286.562839][    C0]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a2/0xa00
[  286.563453][    C0]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270
[  286.564112][    C0]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x11/0xb0
[  286.564677][    C0]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x84/0x270
[  286.565317][    C0]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xdb/0x120
[  286.565922][    C0]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  286.566542][    C0] RIP: 0033:0x7fe3c05e6504
[  286.567102][    C0] Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d c5 8b 10 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
[  286.568931][    C0] RSP: 002b:00007fff76444f58 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[  286.569807][    C0] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000003b40d930 RCX: 00007fe3c05e6504
[  286.570621][    C0] RDX: 00000000000000cf RSI: 000000003b40d930 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  286.571443][    C0] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00000000000000cf R09: 000000003b40d930
[  286.572246][    C0] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 000000003b40cd60
[  286.573069][    C0] R13: 00000000000000cf R14: 00007fe3c07417f8 R15: 00007fe3c073502e
[  286.573886][    C0]  </TASK>

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nvme/5hdonndzoqa265oq3bj6iarwtfk5dewxxjtbjvn5uqnwclpwt6@a2n6w3taxxex/
Signed-off-by: Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit bc7e0975093567f51be8e1bdf4aa5900a3cf0b1e ]

btrfs_prelim_ref() calls the old and new reference variables in the
incorrect order. This causes a NULL pointer dereference because oldref
is passed as NULL to trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert().

Note, trace_btrfs_prelim_ref_insert() is being called with newref as
oldref (and oldref as NULL) on purpose in order to print out
the values of newref.

To reproduce:
echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/btrfs/btrfs_prelim_ref_insert/enable

Perform some writeback operations.

Backtrace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
 #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
 PGD 115949067 P4D 115949067 PUD 11594a067 PMD 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1188 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-tester+ #47 PREEMPT(voluntary)  7ca2cef72d5e9c600f0c7718adb6462de8149622
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-2-gc13ff2cd-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 RIP: 0010:trace_event_raw_event_btrfs__prelim_ref+0x72/0x130
 Code: e8 43 81 9f ff 48 85 c0 74 78 4d 85 e4 0f 84 8f 00 00 00 49 8b 94 24 c0 06 00 00 48 8b 0a 48 89 48 08 48 8b 52 08 48 89 50 10 <49> 8b 55 18 48 89 50 18 49 8b 55 20 48 89 50 20 41 0f b6 55 28 88
 RSP: 0018:ffffce44820077a0 EFLAGS: 00010286
 RAX: ffff8c6b403f9014 RBX: ffff8c6b55825730 RCX: 304994edf9cf506b
 RDX: d8b11eb7f0fdb699 RSI: ffff8c6b403f9010 RDI: ffff8c6b403f9010
 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000010
 R10: 00000000ffffffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8c6b4e8fb000
 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffce44820077a8 R15: ffff8c6b4abd1540
 FS:  00007f4dc6813740(0000) GS:ffff8c6c1d378000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 CR2: 0000000000000018 CR3: 000000010eb42000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
 PKRU: 55555554
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  prelim_ref_insert+0x1c1/0x270
  find_parent_nodes+0x12a6/0x1ee0
  ? __entry_text_end+0x101f06/0x101f09
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
  btrfs_is_data_extent_shared+0x167/0x640
  ? fiemap_process_hole+0xd0/0x2c0
  extent_fiemap+0xa5c/0xbc0
  ? __entry_text_end+0x101f05/0x101f09
  btrfs_fiemap+0x7e/0xd0
  do_vfs_ioctl+0x425/0x9d0
  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x75/0xc0

Signed-off-by: Goldwyn Rodrigues <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 5d2ea5aebbb2f3ebde4403f9c55b2b057e5dd2d6 ]

Upon RQ destruction if the firmware command fails which is the
last resource to be destroyed some SW resources were already cleaned
regardless of the failure.

Now properly rollback the object to its original state upon such failure.

In order to avoid a use-after free in case someone tries to destroy the
object again, which results in the following kernel trace:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 37589 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
Modules linked in: rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) rfkill mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample mlxfw(OE) mlx_compat(OE) macsec tls pci_hyperv_intf sunrpc vfat fat virtio_net net_failover failover fuse loop nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vmw_vmci vsock xfs crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce virtio_console virtio_gpu virtio_blk virtio_dma_buf virtio_mmio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod xpmem(OE)
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 37589 Comm: python3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE     -------  ---  6.12.0-54.el10.aarch64 #1
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
lr : refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
sp : ffff80008b81b7e0
x29: ffff80008b81b7e0 x28: ffff000133d51600 x27: 0000000000000001
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000ffffffea x24: ffff00010ae80f00
x23: ffff00010ae80f80 x22: ffff0000c66e5d08 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffff0000c66e0000 x19: ffff00010ae80340 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000020 x15: ffff80008b81b37f
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2e656572662d7265 x12: ffff80008283ef78
x11: ffff80008257efd0 x10: ffff80008283efd0 x9 : ffff80008021ed90
x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00000000000bffe8 x6 : c0000000ffff7fff
x5 : ffff0001fb8e3408 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800179993000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff000133d51600
Call trace:
 refcount_warn_saturate+0xf4/0x148
 mlx5_core_put_rsc+0x88/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
 mlx5_core_destroy_rq_tracked+0x64/0x98 [mlx5_ib]
 mlx5_ib_destroy_wq+0x34/0x80 [mlx5_ib]
 ib_destroy_wq_user+0x30/0xc0 [ib_core]
 uverbs_free_wq+0x28/0x58 [ib_uverbs]
 destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x34/0x78 [ib_uverbs]
 uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x48/0x240 [ib_uverbs]
 __uverbs_cleanup_ufile+0xd4/0x1a8 [ib_uverbs]
 uverbs_destroy_ufile_hw+0x48/0x120 [ib_uverbs]
 ib_uverbs_close+0x2c/0x100 [ib_uverbs]
 __fput+0xd8/0x2f0
 __fput_sync+0x50/0x70
 __arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90
 invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x74/0xd0
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0xe8
 el0_svc+0x44/0x1d0
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x130
 el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8

Fixes: e2013b2 ("net/mlx5_core: Add RQ and SQ event handling")
Signed-off-by: Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/3181433ccdd695c63560eeeb3f0c990961732101.1745839855.git.leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 6e9f2df1c550ead7cecb3e450af1105735020c92 ]

syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in txopt_get(). [0]

The offset 0x70 was of struct ipv6_txoptions in struct ipv6_pinfo,
so struct ipv6_pinfo was NULL there.

However, this never happens for IPv6 sockets as inet_sk(sk)->pinet6
is always set in inet6_create(), meaning the socket was not IPv6 one.

The root cause is missing validation in netlbl_conn_setattr().

netlbl_conn_setattr() switches branches based on struct
sockaddr.sa_family, which is passed from userspace.  However,
netlbl_conn_setattr() does not check if the address family matches
the socket.

The syzkaller must have called connect() for an IPv6 address on
an IPv4 socket.

We have a proper validation in tcp_v[46]_connect(), but
security_socket_connect() is called in the earlier stage.

Let's copy the validation to netlbl_conn_setattr().

[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12928 Comm: syz.9.1677 Not tainted 6.12.0 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:txopt_get include/net/ipv6.h:390 [inline]
RIP: 0010:
Code: 02 00 00 49 8b ac 24 f8 02 00 00 e8 84 69 2a fd e8 ff 00 16 fd 48 8d 7d 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 53 02 00 00 48 8b 6d 70 48 85 ed 0f 84 ab 01 00
RSP: 0018:ffff88811b8afc48 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff11023715f8a RCX: ffffffff841ab00c
RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffc90007d9e000 RDI: 0000000000000070
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed1023715f9d R09: ffffed1023715f9e
R10: ffffed1023715f9d R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff888123075f00
R13: ffff88810245bd80 R14: ffff888113646780 R15: ffff888100578a80
FS:  00007f9019bd7640(0000) GS:ffff8882d2d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f901b927bac CR3: 0000000104788003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 calipso_sock_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:557
 netlbl_conn_setattr+0x10c/0x280 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1177
 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper+0xd3/0x1b0 security/selinux/netlabel.c:569
 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked security/selinux/netlabel.c:597 [inline]
 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xb6/0x100 security/selinux/netlabel.c:615
 selinux_socket_connect+0x5f/0x80 security/selinux/hooks.c:4931
 security_socket_connect+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4598
 __sys_connect_file+0xa4/0x190 net/socket.c:2067
 __sys_connect+0x12c/0x170 net/socket.c:2088
 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2098 [inline]
 __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2095 [inline]
 __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:2095
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f901b61a12d
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f9019bd6fa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f901b925fa0 RCX: 00007f901b61a12d
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000200000000140 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f901b701505 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f901b5b62a0 R15: 00007f9019bb7000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

Fixes: ceba183 ("calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: John Cheung <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=M1LzunrcQB1fSGauMrJrhL6GGps5cPAKzHJXj6GQV+-g@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit ffb34a60ce86656ba12d46e91f1ccc71dd221251 ]

Reorder the initialization sequence in `usbhs_probe()` to enable runtime
PM before accessing registers, preventing potential crashes due to
uninitialized clocks.

Currently, in the probe path, registers are accessed before enabling the
clocks, leading to a synchronous external abort on the RZ/V2H SoC.
The problematic call flow is as follows:

    usbhs_probe()
        usbhs_sys_clock_ctrl()
            usbhs_bset()
                usbhs_write()
                    iowrite16()  <-- Register access before enabling clocks

Since `iowrite16()` is performed without ensuring the required clocks are
enabled, this can lead to access errors. To fix this, enable PM runtime
early in the probe function and ensure clocks are acquired before register
access, preventing crashes like the following on RZ/V2H:

[13.272640] Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[13.280814] Modules linked in: cec renesas_usbhs(+) drm_kms_helper fuse drm backlight ipv6
[13.289088] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 195 Comm: (udev-worker) Not tainted 6.14.0-rc7+ #98
[13.296640] Hardware name: Renesas RZ/V2H EVK Board based on r9a09g057h44 (DT)
[13.303834] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[13.310770] pc : usbhs_bset+0x14/0x4c [renesas_usbhs]
[13.315831] lr : usbhs_probe+0x2e4/0x5ac [renesas_usbhs]
[13.321138] sp : ffff8000827e3850
[13.324438] x29: ffff8000827e3860 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff8000827e3ca0
[13.331554] x26: ffff8000827e3ba0 x25: ffff800081729668 x24: 0000000000000025
[13.338670] x23: ffff0000c0f08000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c0f08010
[13.345783] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000c3b52080 x18: 00000000ffffffff
[13.352895] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff8000827e36ce
[13.360009] x14: 00000000000003d7 x13: 00000000000003d7 x12: 0000000000000000
[13.367122] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000aa0 x9 : ffff8000827e3750
[13.374235] x8 : ffff0000c1850b00 x7 : 0000000003826060 x6 : 000000000000001c
[13.381347] x5 : 000000030d5fcc00 x4 : ffff8000825c0000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[13.388459] x2 : 0000000000000400 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0000c3b52080
[13.395574] Call trace:
[13.398013]  usbhs_bset+0x14/0x4c [renesas_usbhs] (P)
[13.403076]  platform_probe+0x68/0xdc
[13.406738]  really_probe+0xbc/0x2c0
[13.410306]  __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x120
[13.414653]  driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x154
[13.418825]  __driver_attach+0x90/0x1a0
[13.422647]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xe0
[13.426470]  driver_attach+0x24/0x30
[13.430032]  bus_add_driver+0xe4/0x208
[13.433766]  driver_register+0x68/0x130
[13.437587]  __platform_driver_register+0x24/0x30
[13.442273]  renesas_usbhs_driver_init+0x20/0x1000 [renesas_usbhs]
[13.448450]  do_one_initcall+0x60/0x1d4
[13.452276]  do_init_module+0x54/0x1f8
[13.456014]  load_module+0x1754/0x1c98
[13.459750]  init_module_from_file+0x88/0xcc
[13.464004]  __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x1c4/0x328
[13.468689]  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104
[13.472426]  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
[13.477113]  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[13.480415]  el0_svc+0x30/0xcc
[13.483460]  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
[13.487800]  el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[13.491453] Code: 2a0103e1 12003c42 12003c63 8b010084 (79400084)
[13.497522] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: f1407d5 ("usb: renesas_usbhs: Add Renesas USBHS common code")
Signed-off-by: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit 227cb4ca5a6502164f850d22aec3104d7888b270 upstream.

When running the following code on an ext4 filesystem with inline_data
feature enabled, it will lead to the bug below.

        fd = open("file1", O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0666);
        ftruncate(fd, 30);
        pwrite(fd, "a", 1, (1UL << 40) + 5UL);

That happens because write_begin will succeed as when
ext4_generic_write_inline_data calls ext4_prepare_inline_data, pos + len
will be truncated, leading to ext4_prepare_inline_data parameter to be 6
instead of 0x10000000006.

Then, later when write_end is called, we hit:

        BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);

at ext4_write_inline_data.

Fix it by using a loff_t type for the len parameter in
ext4_prepare_inline_data instead of an unsigned int.

[   44.545164] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   44.545530] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:240!
[   44.545834] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[   44.546172] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: test Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00003-g9080916f4863 #45 PREEMPT(full)  112853fcebfdb93254270a7959841d2c6aa2c8bb
[   44.546523] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   44.546523] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100
[   44.546523] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49
[   44.546523] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216
[   44.546523] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006
[   44.546523] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738
[   44.546523] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   44.546523] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000
[   44.546523] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738
[   44.546523] FS:  00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   44.546523] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   44.546523] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0
[   44.546523] PKRU: 55555554
[   44.546523] Call Trace:
[   44.546523]  <TASK>
[   44.546523]  ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x126/0x2d0
[   44.546523]  generic_perform_write+0x17e/0x270
[   44.546523]  ext4_buffered_write_iter+0xc8/0x170
[   44.546523]  vfs_write+0x2be/0x3e0
[   44.546523]  __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x6d/0xc0
[   44.546523]  do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0
[   44.546523]  ? __wake_up+0x89/0xb0
[   44.546523]  ? xas_find+0x72/0x1c0
[   44.546523]  ? next_uptodate_folio+0x317/0x330
[   44.546523]  ? set_pte_range+0x1a6/0x270
[   44.546523]  ? filemap_map_pages+0x6ee/0x840
[   44.546523]  ? ext4_setattr+0x2fa/0x750
[   44.546523]  ? do_pte_missing+0x128/0xf70
[   44.546523]  ? security_inode_post_setattr+0x3e/0xd0
[   44.546523]  ? ___pte_offset_map+0x19/0x100
[   44.546523]  ? handle_mm_fault+0x721/0xa10
[   44.546523]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x197/0x730
[   44.546523]  ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0
[   44.546523]  ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e/0x60
[   44.546523]  ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90
[   44.546523]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d
[   44.546523] RIP: 0033:0x7f42999c6687
[   44.546523] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff
[   44.546523] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae4a7930 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
[   44.546523] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4299934740 RCX: 00007f42999c6687
[   44.546523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000055ea6149200f RDI: 0000000000000003
[   44.546523] RBP: 00007ffeae4a79a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   44.546523] R10: 0000010000000005 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000
[   44.546523] R13: 00007ffeae4a7ac8 R14: 00007f4299b86000 R15: 000055ea61493dd8
[   44.546523]  </TASK>
[   44.546523] Modules linked in:
[   44.568501] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   44.568889] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100
[   44.569328] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49
[   44.570931] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216
[   44.571356] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006
[   44.571959] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738
[   44.572571] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[   44.573148] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000
[   44.573748] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738
[   44.574335] FS:  00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   44.575027] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   44.575520] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0
[   44.576112] PKRU: 55555554
[   44.576338] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[   44.576517] Kernel Offset: 0x1a600000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)

Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fe2a25dae02a207717a0
Fixes: f19d587 ("ext4: add normal write support for inline data")
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250415-ext4-prepare-inline-overflow-v1-1-f4c13d900967@igalia.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit 5db0d252c64e91ba1929c70112352e85dc5751e7 upstream.

w/ below testcase, resize will generate a corrupted image which
contains inconsistent metadata, so when mounting such image, it
will trigger kernel panic:

touch img
truncate -s $((512*1024*1024*1024)) img
mkfs.f2fs -f img $((256*1024*1024))
resize.f2fs -s -i img -t $((1024*1024*1024))
mount img /mnt/f2fs

------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:863!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 3922 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1+ #191 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x47c/0x490

Call Trace:
 f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x11c3/0x2600
 f2fs_fill_super+0xe97/0x2840
 mount_bdev+0xf4/0x140
 legacy_get_tree+0x2b/0x50
 vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xd0
 path_mount+0x487/0xaf0
 __x64_sys_mount+0x116/0x150
 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fdbfde1bcfe

The reaseon is:

sit_i->bitmap_size is 192, so size of sit bitmap is 192*8=1536, at maximum
there are 1536 sit blocks, however MAIN_SEGS is 261893, so that sit_blk_cnt
is 4762, build_sit_entries() -> current_sit_addr() tries to access
out-of-boundary in sit_bitmap at offset from [1536, 4762), once sit_bitmap
and sit_bitmap_mirror is not the same, it will trigger f2fs_bug_on().

Let's add sanity check in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt() to avoid panic.

Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit 05f6e183879d9785a3cdf2f08a498bc31b7a20aa upstream.

If fb_add_videomode() in fb_set_var() fails to allocate memory for
fb_videomode, later it may lead to a null-ptr dereference in
fb_videomode_to_var(), as the fb_info is registered while not having the
mode in modelist that is expected to be there, i.e. the one that is
described in fb_info->var.

================================================================
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 1 PID: 30371 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.10.226-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:fb_videomode_to_var+0x24/0x610 drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:901
Call Trace:
 display_to_var+0x3a/0x7c0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:929
 fbcon_resize+0x3e2/0x8f0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2071
 resize_screen drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1176 [inline]
 vc_do_resize+0x53a/0x1170 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:1263
 fbcon_modechanged+0x3ac/0x6e0 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2720
 fbcon_update_vcs+0x43/0x60 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2776
 do_fb_ioctl+0x6d2/0x740 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1128
 fb_ioctl+0xe7/0x150 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c:1203
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x19a/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:739
 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0xd1
================================================================

The reason is that fb_info->var is being modified in fb_set_var(), and
then fb_videomode_to_var() is called. If it fails to add the mode to
fb_info->modelist, fb_set_var() returns error, but does not restore the
old value of fb_info->var. Restore fb_info->var on failure the same way
it is done earlier in the function.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Murad Masimov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit f914b52c379c12288b7623bb814d0508dbe7481d upstream.

The following issue happens with a buggy module:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc05d0218
PGD 1bd66f067 P4D 1bd66f067 PUD 1bd671067 PMD 101808067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
RIP: 0010:sized_strscpy+0x81/0x2f0
RSP: 0018:ffff88812d76fa08 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0601010 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff88812608da2d
RBP: 8080808080808080 R08: ffff88812608da2d R09: ffff88812608da68
R10: ffff88812608d82d R11: ffff88812608d810 R12: 0000000000000038
R13: ffff88812608da2d R14: ffffffffc05d0218 R15: fefefefefefefeff
FS:  00007fef552de740(0000) GS:ffff8884251c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffc05d0218 CR3: 00000001146f0000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ftrace_mod_get_kallsym+0x1ac/0x590
 update_iter_mod+0x239/0x5b0
 s_next+0x5b/0xa0
 seq_read_iter+0x8c9/0x1070
 seq_read+0x249/0x3b0
 proc_reg_read+0x1b0/0x280
 vfs_read+0x17f/0x920
 ksys_read+0xf3/0x1c0
 do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x2e0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The above issue may happen as follows:
(1) Add kprobe tracepoint;
(2) insmod test.ko;
(3)  Module triggers ftrace disabled;
(4) rmmod test.ko;
(5) cat /proc/kallsyms; --> Will trigger UAF as test.ko already removed;
ftrace_mod_get_kallsym()
...
strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);
...

The problem is when a module triggers an issue with ftrace and
sets ftrace_disable. The ftrace_disable is set when an anomaly is
discovered and to prevent any more damage, ftrace stops all text
modification. The issue that happened was that the ftrace_disable stops
more than just the text modification.

When a module is loaded, its init functions can also be traced. Because
kallsyms deletes the init functions after a module has loaded, ftrace
saves them when the module is loaded and function tracing is enabled. This
allows the output of the function trace to show the init function names
instead of just their raw memory addresses.

When a module is removed, ftrace_release_mod() is called, and if
ftrace_disable is set, it just returns without doing anything more. The
problem here is that it leaves the mod_list still around and if kallsyms
is called, it will call into this code and access the module memory that
has already been freed as it will return:

  strscpy(module_name, mod_map->mod->name, MODULE_NAME_LEN);

Where the "mod" no longer exists and triggers a UAF bug.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: aba4b5c ("ftrace: Save module init functions kallsyms symbols for tracing")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit a4685408ff6c3e2af366ad9a7274f45ff3f394ee ]

[ Syzkaller Report ]

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000087: 0000 [#1
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000438-0x000000000000043f]
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 10614 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
6.13.0-rc6-gfbfd64d25c7a-dirty #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-30ms
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS:  00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x61/0xb0
? die_addr+0xb1/0xe0
? exc_general_protection+0x333/0x510
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30
? jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
jfs_ioctl+0x3c8/0x4f0
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_jfs_ioctl+0x10/0x10
__se_sys_ioctl+0x269/0x350
? __pfx___se_sys_ioctl+0x10/0x10
? do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xee/0x210
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e0/0x330
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe51f4903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48
89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d
RSP: 002b:00007fe5202250c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe51f5cbf80 RCX: 00007fe51f4903ad
RDX: 0000000020000680 RSI: 00000000c0185879 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe520225640
R13: 000000000000000e R14: 00007fe51f44fca0 R15: 00007fe52021d000
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:jfs_ioc_trim+0x34b/0x8f0
Code: e7 e8 59 a4 87 fe 4d 8b 24 24 4d 8d bc 24 38 04 00 00 48 8d 93
90 82 fe ff 4c 89 ff 31 f6
RSP: 0018:ffffc900055f7cd0 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: 00005866a9e67ff8 RCX: 000000000000000a
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffff88807c180003 R09: 1ffff1100f830000
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f830001 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000438
FS:  00007fe520225640(0000) GS:ffff8880b7e80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005593c91b2c88 CR3: 000000014927c000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

[ Analysis ]

We believe that we have found a concurrency bug in the `fs/jfs` module
that results in a null pointer dereference. There is a closely related
issue which has been fixed:

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=d6c1b3599b2feb5c7291f5ac3a36e5fa7cedb234

... but, unfortunately, the accepted patch appears to still be
susceptible to a null pointer dereference under some interleavings.

To trigger the bug, we think that `JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap` is set
to NULL in `dbFreeBits` and then dereferenced in `jfs_ioc_trim`. This
bug manifests quite rarely under normal circumstances, but is
triggereable from a syz-program.

Reported-and-tested-by: Dylan J. Wolff<[email protected]>
Reported-and-tested-by: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dylan J. Wolff<[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jiacheng Xu <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit ec9e6f22bce433b260ea226de127ec68042849b0 upstream.

Syzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault
injection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn't
check return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any
error propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls
jffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated
node.

kernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline]
 jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874
 jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388
 jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197
 jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362
 jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301
 generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856
 __generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973
 generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline]
 do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735
 do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861
 vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
 iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685
 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline]
 direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950
 splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896
 do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002
 do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255
 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Fix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs
before calling jffs2_sum_write_data.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 2f78540 ("[JFFS2] Reduce visibility of raw_node_ref to upper layers of JFFS2 code.")
Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 10876da918fa1aec0227fb4c67647513447f53a9 ]

syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in sock_omalloc() while allocating
a CALIPSO option.  [0]

The NULL is of struct sock, which was fetched by sk_to_full_sk() in
calipso_req_setattr().

Since commit a1a5344 ("tcp: avoid two atomic ops for syncookies"),
reqsk->rsk_listener could be NULL when SYN Cookie is returned to its
client, as hinted by the leading SYN Cookie log.

Here are 3 options to fix the bug:

  1) Return 0 in calipso_req_setattr()
  2) Return an error in calipso_req_setattr()
  3) Alaways set rsk_listener

1) is no go as it bypasses LSM, but 2) effectively disables SYN Cookie
for CALIPSO.  3) is also no go as there have been many efforts to reduce
atomic ops and make TCP robust against DDoS.  See also commit 3b24d85
("tcp/dccp: do not touch listener sk_refcnt under synflood").

As of the blamed commit, SYN Cookie already did not need refcounting,
and no one has stumbled on the bug for 9 years, so no CALIPSO user will
care about SYN Cookie.

Let's return an error in calipso_req_setattr() and calipso_req_delattr()
in the SYN Cookie case.

This can be reproduced by [1] on Fedora and now connect() of nc times out.

[0]:
TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port [::]:20002. Sending cookies.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037]
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 12262 Comm: syz.1.2611 Not tainted 6.14.0 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:read_pnet include/net/net_namespace.h:406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_net include/net/sock.h:655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:sock_kmalloc+0x35/0x170 net/core/sock.c:2806
Code: 89 d5 41 54 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 25 e3 c6 fd e8 f0 91 e3 00 48 8d 7b 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
RSP: 0018:ffff88811af89038 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff888105266400
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff88800c890000 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: 0000000000000050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810526640e
R10: ffffed1020a4cc81 R11: ffff88810526640f R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000820 R14: ffff888105266400 R15: 0000000000000050
FS:  00007f0653a07640(0000) GS:ffff88811af80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f863ba096f4 CR3: 00000000163c0005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
PKRU: 80000000
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ipv6_renew_options+0x279/0x950 net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1288
 calipso_req_setattr+0x181/0x340 net/ipv6/calipso.c:1204
 calipso_req_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:597
 netlbl_req_setattr+0x18a/0x440 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1249
 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request+0x1fb/0x320 security/selinux/netlabel.c:342
 selinux_inet_conn_request+0x1eb/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:5551
 security_inet_conn_request+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4945
 tcp_v6_route_req+0x22c/0x550 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:825
 tcp_conn_request+0xec8/0x2b70 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7275
 tcp_v6_conn_request+0x1e3/0x440 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1328
 tcp_rcv_state_process+0xafa/0x52b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6781
 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x8a6/0x1a40 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1667
 tcp_v6_rcv+0x505e/0x5b50 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1904
 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x17c/0x1da0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:436
 ip6_input_finish+0x103/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:480
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip6_input+0x13c/0x6b0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:491
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:469 [inline]
 ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79 [inline]
 ip6_rcv_finish+0xb6/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ipv6_rcv+0xf9/0x490 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x12e/0x1f0 net/core/dev.c:5896
 __netif_receive_skb+0x1d/0x170 net/core/dev.c:6009
 process_backlog+0x41e/0x13b0 net/core/dev.c:6357
 __napi_poll+0xbd/0x710 net/core/dev.c:7191
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:7260 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x9de/0xde0 net/core/dev.c:7382
 handle_softirqs+0x19a/0x770 kernel/softirq.c:561
 do_softirq.part.0+0x36/0x70 kernel/softirq.c:462
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 do_softirq arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:26 [inline]
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xf1/0x110 kernel/softirq.c:389
 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
 rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:919 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0xc2a/0x3c40 net/core/dev.c:4679
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3313 [inline]
 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:523 [inline]
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:537 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0xd69/0x1f80 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:141
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output+0x5dc/0xd60 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:226
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:303 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x24b/0x8d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:247
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:459 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:308 [inline]
 ip6_xmit+0xbbc/0x20d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:366
 inet6_csk_xmit+0x39a/0x720 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1a7b/0x3b40 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1471
 tcp_transmit_skb net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1489 [inline]
 tcp_send_syn_data net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4059 [inline]
 tcp_connect+0x1c0c/0x4510 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:4148
 tcp_v6_connect+0x156c/0x2080 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:333
 __inet_stream_connect+0x3a7/0xed0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:677
 tcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x3e2/0x710 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1039
 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x1e82/0x3570 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1091
 tcp_sendmsg+0x2f/0x50 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1358
 inet6_sendmsg+0xb9/0x150 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:659
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0xf4/0x2a0 net/socket.c:733
 __sys_sendto+0x29a/0x390 net/socket.c:2187
 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2194 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2190 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1c0 net/socket.c:2190
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f06553c47ed
Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f0653a06fc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f0655605fa0 RCX: 00007f06553c47ed
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 00007f065545db38 R08: 0000200000000140 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: f7384d4ea84b01bd R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f0655605fac R14: 00007f0655606038 R15: 00007f06539e7000
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

[1]:
dnf install -y selinux-policy-targeted policycoreutils netlabel_tools procps-ng nmap-ncat
mount -t selinuxfs none /sys/fs/selinux
load_policy
netlabelctl calipso add pass doi:1
netlabelctl map del default
netlabelctl map add default address:::1 protocol:calipso,1
sysctl net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies=2
nc -l ::1 80 &
nc ::1 80

Fixes: e1adea9 ("calipso: Allow request sockets to be relabelled by the lsm.")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Reported-by: John Cheung <[email protected]>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=MvfhrGADy+-WJiftV2_WzMH4VEhEFmeT28qY+4yxNu4w@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit fee4d171451c1ad9e8aaf65fc0ab7d143a33bd72 ]

Commit a5951389e58d ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the
spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists") added some additional CPUs to the
Spectre-BHB workaround, including some new arrays for designs that
require new 'k' values for the workaround to be effective.

Unfortunately, the new arrays omitted the sentinel entry and so
is_midr_in_range_list() will walk off the end when it doesn't find a
match. With UBSAN enabled, this leads to a crash during boot when
is_midr_in_range_list() is inlined (which was more common prior to
c8c2647e69be ("arm64: Make  _midr_in_range_list() an exported
function")):

 |  Internal error: aarch64 BRK: 00000000f2000001 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 |  pstate: 804000c5 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 |  pc : spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30
 |  lr : is_spectre_bhb_affected+0x170/0x190
 | [...]
 |  Call trace:
 |   spectre_bhb_loop_affected+0x28/0x30
 |   update_cpu_capabilities+0xc0/0x184
 |   init_cpu_features+0x188/0x1a4
 |   cpuinfo_store_boot_cpu+0x4c/0x60
 |   smp_prepare_boot_cpu+0x38/0x54
 |   start_kernel+0x8c/0x478
 |   __primary_switched+0xc8/0xd4
 |  Code: 6b09011f 54000061 52801080 d65f03c0 (d4200020)
 |  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 |  Kernel panic - not syncing: aarch64 BRK: Fatal exception

Add the missing sentinel entries.

Cc: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Cc: James Morse <[email protected]>
Cc: Doug Anderson <[email protected]>
Cc: Shameer Kolothum <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Fixes: a5951389e58d ("arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Pu Lehui <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 10685681bafce6febb39770f3387621bf5d67d0b ]

The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.

This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
  dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
  ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
  sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
  sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
  sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
  sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
  qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
  tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
  qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
  dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
  netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
  dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
  __dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
  dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
  unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
  unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
  __tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
  tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
  tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
  __fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
  task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
  exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
  do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
  do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
  __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
  __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270

The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):

tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1

Scenario that triggers the crash:

* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1

* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
  gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
  it schedules itself for later.

* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
  qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
  by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
  however q->tail is not NULL.

At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access.

Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Octavian Purdila <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
Currently, we are unnecessarily holding a regulator_ww_class_mutex lock
when creating debugfs entries for a newly created regulator. This was
brought up as a concern in the discussion in commit cba6cfdc7c3f
("regulator: core: Avoid lockdep reports when resolving supplies").

This causes the following lockdep splat after executing
`ls /sys/kernel/debug` on my platform:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.15.167-axis9-devel #1 Tainted: G           O
  ------------------------------------------------------
  ls/2146 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffff803a562918 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: __might_fault+0x40/0x88

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffff80014497f8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{3:3}, at: iterate_dir+0x50/0x1f4

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  [...]

  Chain exists of:
    &mm->mmap_lock --> regulator_ww_class_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
                                 lock(regulator_ww_class_mutex);
                                 lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
    lock(&mm->mmap_lock);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

This lock dependency still exists on the latest kernel and using a newer
non-tainted kernel would still cause this problem.

Fix by moving sysfs symlinking and creation of debugfs entries to after
the release of the regulator lock.

Bug: 254441685
Fixes: cba6cfdc7c3f ("regulator: core: Avoid lockdep reports when resolving supplies")
Fixes: eaa7995c529b ("regulator: core: avoid regulator_resolve_supply() race condition")
Signed-off-by: Ludvig Pärsson <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 1c81a8c78ae653f3a21cde0f37a91f1b22b7d2fb)
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <[email protected]>
Change-Id: I1339abdfda460221e7e3fae3dae465b76f972394
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 1e46ed947ec658f89f1a910d880cd05e42d3763e ]

1. LINE#1794 - LINE#1887 is some codes about function of
   bch_cache_set_alloc().
2. LINE#2078 - LINE#2142 is some codes about function of
   register_cache_set().
3. register_cache_set() will call bch_cache_set_alloc() in LINE#2098.

 1794 struct cache_set *bch_cache_set_alloc(struct cache_sb *sb)
 1795 {
 ...
 1860         if (!(c->devices = kcalloc(c->nr_uuids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL)) ||
 1861             mempool_init_slab_pool(&c->search, 32, bch_search_cache) ||
 1862             mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&c->bio_meta, 2,
 1863                                 sizeof(struct bbio) + sizeof(struct bio_vec) *
 1864                                 bucket_pages(c)) ||
 1865             mempool_init_kmalloc_pool(&c->fill_iter, 1, iter_size) ||
 1866             bioset_init(&c->bio_split, 4, offsetof(struct bbio, bio),
 1867                         BIOSET_NEED_BVECS|BIOSET_NEED_RESCUER) ||
 1868             !(c->uuids = alloc_bucket_pages(GFP_KERNEL, c)) ||
 1869             !(c->moving_gc_wq = alloc_workqueue("bcache_gc",
 1870                                                 WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 0)) ||
 1871             bch_journal_alloc(c) ||
 1872             bch_btree_cache_alloc(c) ||
 1873             bch_open_buckets_alloc(c) ||
 1874             bch_bset_sort_state_init(&c->sort, ilog2(c->btree_pages)))
 1875                 goto err;
                      ^^^^^^^^
 1876
 ...
 1883         return c;
 1884 err:
 1885         bch_cache_set_unregister(c);
              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 1886         return NULL;
 1887 }
 ...
 2078 static const char *register_cache_set(struct cache *ca)
 2079 {
 ...
 2098         c = bch_cache_set_alloc(&ca->sb);
 2099         if (!c)
 2100                 return err;
                      ^^^^^^^^^^
 ...
 2128         ca->set = c;
 2129         ca->set->cache[ca->sb.nr_this_dev] = ca;
              ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 ...
 2138         return NULL;
 2139 err:
 2140         bch_cache_set_unregister(c);
 2141         return err;
 2142 }

(1) If LINE#1860 - LINE#1874 is true, then do 'goto err'(LINE#1875) and
    call bch_cache_set_unregister()(LINE#1885).
(2) As (1) return NULL(LINE#1886), LINE#2098 - LINE#2100 would return.
(3) As (2) has returned, LINE#2128 - LINE#2129 would do *not* give the
    value to c->cache[], it means that c->cache[] is NULL.

LINE#1624 - LINE#1665 is some codes about function of cache_set_flush().
As (1), in LINE#1885 call
bch_cache_set_unregister()
---> bch_cache_set_stop()
     ---> closure_queue()
          -.-> cache_set_flush() (as below LINE#1624)

 1624 static void cache_set_flush(struct closure *cl)
 1625 {
 ...
 1654         for_each_cache(ca, c, i)
 1655                 if (ca->alloc_thread)
                          ^^
 1656                         kthread_stop(ca->alloc_thread);
 ...
 1665 }

(4) In LINE#1655 ca is NULL(see (3)) in cache_set_flush() then the
    kernel crash occurred as below:
[  846.712887] bcache: register_cache() error drbd6: cannot allocate memory
[  846.713242] bcache: register_bcache() error : failed to register device
[  846.713336] bcache: cache_set_free() Cache set 2f84bdc1-498a-4f2f-98a7-01946bf54287 unregistered
[  846.713768] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000009f8
[  846.714790] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  846.715129] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[  846.715472] CPU: 19 PID: 5057 Comm: kworker/19:16 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE    --------- -  - 4.18.0-147.5.1.el8_1.5es.3.x86_64 #1
[  846.716082] Hardware name: ESPAN GI-25212/X11DPL-i, BIOS 2.1 06/15/2018
[  846.716451] Workqueue: events cache_set_flush [bcache]
[  846.716808] RIP: 0010:cache_set_flush+0xc9/0x1b0 [bcache]
[  846.717155] Code: 00 4c 89 a5 b0 03 00 00 48 8b 85 68 f6 ff ff a8 08 0f 84 88 00 00 00 31 db 66 83 bd 3c f7 ff ff 00 48 8b 85 48 ff ff ff 74 28 <48> 8b b8 f8 09 00 00 48 85 ff 74 05 e8 b6 58 a2 e1 0f b7 95 3c f7
[  846.718026] RSP: 0018:ffffb56dcf85fe70 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  846.718372] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  846.718725] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000040000001 RDI: 0000000000000000
[  846.719076] RBP: ffffa0ccc0f20df8 R08: ffffa0ce1fedb118 R09: 000073746e657665
[  846.719428] R10: 8080808080808080 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0ce1fee8700
[  846.719779] R13: ffffa0ccc0f211a8 R14: ffffa0cd1b902840 R15: ffffa0ccc0f20e00
[  846.720132] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa0ce1fec0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  846.720726] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  846.721073] CR2: 00000000000009f8 CR3: 00000008ba00a005 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[  846.721426] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  846.721778] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  846.722131] PKRU: 55555554
[  846.722467] Call Trace:
[  846.722814]  process_one_work+0x1a7/0x3b0
[  846.723157]  worker_thread+0x30/0x390
[  846.723501]  ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0
[  846.723844]  kthread+0x112/0x130
[  846.724184]  ? kthread_flush_work_fn+0x10/0x10
[  846.724535]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40

Now, check whether that ca is NULL in LINE#1655 to fix the issue.

Signed-off-by: Linggang Zeng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mingzhe Zou <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 387602d8a75574fafb451b7a8215e78dfd67ee63 ]

Don't set WDM_READ flag in wdm_in_callback() for ZLP-s, otherwise when
userspace tries to poll for available data, it might - incorrectly -
believe there is something available, and when it tries to non-blocking
read it, it might get stuck in the read loop.

For example this is what glib does for non-blocking read (briefly):

  1. poll()
  2. if poll returns with non-zero, starts a read data loop:
    a. loop on poll() (EINTR disabled)
    b. if revents was set, reads data
      I. if read returns with EINTR or EAGAIN, goto 2.a.
      II. otherwise return with data

So if ZLP sets WDM_READ (#1), we expect data, and try to read it (#2).
But as that was a ZLP, and we are doing non-blocking read, wdm_read()
returns with EAGAIN (#2.b.I), so loop again, and try to read again
(#2.a.).

With glib, we might stuck in this loop forever, as EINTR is disabled
(#2.a).

Signed-off-by: Robert Hodaszi <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
…to avoid GPF

[ Upstream commit 1a726cb47fd204109c767409fa9ca15a96328f14 ]

The call to get_user_pages_fast() in vmci_host_setup_notify() can return
NULL context->notify_page causing a GPF. To avoid GPF check if
context->notify_page == NULL and return error if so.

general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
    0xe0009d1000000060: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x0005088000000300-
    0x0005088000000307]
CPU: 2 PID: 26180 Comm: repro_34802241 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4 #1
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.15.0-2.module+el8.6.0 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vmci_ctx_check_signal_notify+0x91/0xe0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 vmci_host_unlocked_ioctl+0x362/0x1f40
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a1/0x230
 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Fixes: a1d8843 ("VMCI: Fix two UVA mapping bugs")
Reported-by: syzkaller <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: George Kennedy <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Vishnu Dasa <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Stable-dep-of: 1bd6406fb5f3 ("VMCI: fix race between vmci_host_setup_notify and vmci_ctx_unset_notify")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 8edab8a72d67742f87e9dc2e2b0cdfddda5dc29a ]

The obj_event may be loaded immediately after inserted, then if the
list_head is not initialized then we may get a poisonous pointer.  This
fixes the crash below:

 mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0: MLX5E: StrdRq(1) RqSz(8) StrdSz(2048) RxCqeCmprss(0 enhanced)
 mlx5_core.sf mlx5_core.sf.4: firmware version: 32.38.3056
 mlx5_core 0000:03:00.0 en3f0pf0sf2002: renamed from eth0
 mlx5_core.sf mlx5_core.sf.4: Rate limit: 127 rates are supported, range: 0Mbps to 195312Mbps
 IPv6: ADDRCONF(NETDEV_CHANGE): en3f0pf0sf2002: link becomes ready
 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000060
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x96000006
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006
   CM = 0, WnR = 0
 user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000007760fb000
 [0000000000000060] pgd=000000076f6d7003, p4d=000000076f6d7003, pud=0000000777841003, pmd=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 96000006 [#1] SMP
 Modules linked in: ipmb_host(OE) act_mirred(E) cls_flower(E) sch_ingress(E) mptcp_diag(E) udp_diag(E) raw_diag(E) unix_diag(E) tcp_diag(E) inet_diag(E) binfmt_misc(E) bonding(OE) rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) isofs(E) cdrom(E) mst_pciconf(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ipmb_dev_int(OE) mlx5_core(OE) kpatch_15237886(OEK) mlxdevm(OE) auxiliary(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) ib_core(OE) psample(E) mlxfw(OE) tls(E) sunrpc(E) vfat(E) fat(E) crct10dif_ce(E) ghash_ce(E) sha1_ce(E) sbsa_gwdt(E) virtio_console(E) ext4(E) mbcache(E) jbd2(E) xfs(E) libcrc32c(E) mmc_block(E) virtio_net(E) net_failover(E) failover(E) sha2_ce(E) sha256_arm64(E) nvme(OE) nvme_core(OE) gpio_mlxbf3(OE) mlx_compat(OE) mlxbf_pmc(OE) i2c_mlxbf(OE) sdhci_of_dwcmshc(OE) pinctrl_mlxbf3(OE) mlxbf_pka(OE) gpio_generic(E) i2c_core(E) mmc_core(E) mlxbf_gige(OE) vitesse(E) pwr_mlxbf(OE) mlxbf_tmfifo(OE) micrel(E) mlxbf_bootctl(OE) virtio_ring(E) virtio(E) ipmi_devintf(E) ipmi_msghandler(E)
  [last unloaded: mst_pci]
 CPU: 11 PID: 20913 Comm: rte-worker-11 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE K   5.10.134-13.1.an8.aarch64 #1
 Hardware name: https://www.mellanox.com BlueField-3 SmartNIC Main Card/BlueField-3 SmartNIC Main Card, BIOS 4.2.2.12968 Oct 26 2023
 pstate: a0400089 (NzCv daIf +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
 pc : dispatch_event_fd+0x68/0x300 [mlx5_ib]
 lr : devx_event_notifier+0xcc/0x228 [mlx5_ib]
 sp : ffff80001005bcf0
 x29: ffff80001005bcf0 x28: 0000000000000001
 x27: ffff244e0740a1d8 x26: ffff244e0740a1d0
 x25: ffffda56beff5ae0 x24: ffffda56bf911618
 x23: ffff244e0596a480 x22: ffff244e0596a480
 x21: ffff244d8312ad90 x20: ffff244e0596a480
 x19: fffffffffffffff0 x18: 0000000000000000
 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffda56be66d620
 x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
 x11: 0000000000000040 x10: ffffda56bfcafb50
 x9 : ffffda5655c25f2c x8 : 0000000000000010
 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffff24545a2e24b8
 x5 : 0000000000000003 x4 : ffff80001005bd28
 x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000
 x1 : ffff244e0596a480 x0 : ffff244d8312ad90
 Call trace:
  dispatch_event_fd+0x68/0x300 [mlx5_ib]
  devx_event_notifier+0xcc/0x228 [mlx5_ib]
  atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0x80
  mlx5_eq_async_int+0x148/0x2b0 [mlx5_core]
  atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x58/0x80
  irq_int_handler+0x20/0x30 [mlx5_core]
  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x60/0x220
  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x3c/0x90
  handle_irq_event+0x58/0x158
  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xfc/0x188
  generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x48
  ...

Fixes: 7597385 ("IB/mlx5: Enable subscription for device events over DEVX")
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/3ce7f20e0d1a03dc7de6e57494ec4b8eaf1f05c2.1750147949.git.leon@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 226862f50a7a88e4e4de9abbf36c64d19acd6fd0 ]

Currently, an interrupt can be triggered during a GPU reset, which can
lead to GPU hangs and NULL pointer dereference in an interrupt context
as shown in the following trace:

 [  314.035040] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000c0
 [  314.043822] Mem abort info:
 [  314.046606]   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
 [  314.050347]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
 [  314.055651]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
 [  314.058695]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
 [  314.061826]   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
 [  314.066694] Data abort info:
 [  314.069564]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
 [  314.075039]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
 [  314.080080]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 [  314.085382] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000102728000
 [  314.091814] [00000000000000c0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
 [  314.100511] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 [  314.106770] Modules linked in: v3d i2c_brcmstb vc4 snd_soc_hdmi_codec gpu_sched drm_shmem_helper drm_display_helper cec drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks snd_soc_core snd_compress snd_pcm_dmaengine snd_pcm snd_timer snd backlight
 [  314.129654] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.25+rpt-rpi-v8 #1  Debian 1:6.12.25-1+rpt1
 [  314.139388] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.4 (DT)
 [  314.145211] pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 [  314.152165] pc : v3d_irq+0xec/0x2e0 [v3d]
 [  314.156187] lr : v3d_irq+0xe0/0x2e0 [v3d]
 [  314.160198] sp : ffffffc080003ea0
 [  314.163502] x29: ffffffc080003ea0 x28: ffffffec1f184980 x27: 021202b000000000
 [  314.170633] x26: ffffffec1f17f630 x25: ffffff8101372000 x24: ffffffec1f17d9f0
 [  314.177764] x23: 000000000000002a x22: 000000000000002a x21: ffffff8103252000
 [  314.184895] x20: 0000000000000001 x19: 00000000deadbeef x18: 0000000000000000
 [  314.192026] x17: ffffff94e51d2000 x16: ffffffec1dac3cb0 x15: c306000000000000
 [  314.199156] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: b2fc982e03cc5168 x12: 0000000000000001
 [  314.206286] x11: ffffff8103f8bcc0 x10: ffffffec1f196868 x9 : ffffffec1dac3874
 [  314.213416] x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000042a3a x6 : ffffff810017a180
 [  314.220547] x5 : ffffffec1ebad400 x4 : ffffffec1ebad320 x3 : 00000000000bebeb
 [  314.227677] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000000
 [  314.234807] Call trace:
 [  314.237243]  v3d_irq+0xec/0x2e0 [v3d]
 [  314.240906]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x58/0x218
 [  314.245609]  handle_irq_event+0x54/0xb8
 [  314.249439]  handle_fasteoi_irq+0xac/0x240
 [  314.253527]  handle_irq_desc+0x48/0x68
 [  314.257269]  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x24/0x38
 [  314.261879]  gic_handle_irq+0x48/0xd8
 [  314.265533]  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58
 [  314.269448]  do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98
 [  314.273624]  el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68
 [  314.277193]  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
 [  314.281281]  el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
 [  314.284673]  default_idle_call+0x3c/0x168
 [  314.288675]  do_idle+0x1fc/0x230
 [  314.291895]  cpu_startup_entry+0x3c/0x50
 [  314.295810]  rest_init+0xe4/0xf0
 [  314.299030]  start_kernel+0x5e8/0x790
 [  314.302684]  __primary_switched+0x80/0x90
 [  314.306691] Code: 940029eb 360ffc13 f9442ea0 52800001 (f9406017)
 [  314.312775] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
 [  314.317384] Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt
 [  314.324249] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
 [  314.328167] Kernel Offset: 0x2b9da00000 from 0xffffffc080000000
 [  314.334076] PHYS_OFFSET: 0x0
 [  314.336946] CPU features: 0x08,00002013,c0200000,0200421b
 [  314.342337] Memory Limit: none
 [  314.345382] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---

Before resetting the GPU, it's necessary to disable all interrupts and
deal with any interrupt handler still in-flight. Otherwise, the GPU might
reset with jobs still running, or yet, an interrupt could be handled
during the reset.

Cc: [email protected]
Fixes: 57692c9 ("drm/v3d: Introduce a new DRM driver for Broadcom V3D V3.x+")
Reviewed-by: Juan A. Suarez <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Iago Toral Quiroga <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
commit 0a2ed70a549e61c5181bad5db418d223b68ae932 upstream.

The kernel occasionally crashes in cpumask_clear_cpu(), which is called
within exit_round_robin(), because when executing clear_bit(nr, addr) with
nr set to 0xffffffff, the address calculation may cause misalignment within
the memory, leading to access to an invalid memory address.

----------
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffe0740618
        ...
CPU: 3 PID: 2919323 Comm: acpi_pad/14 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G           OE  X --------- -  - 4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64 #1
        ...
RIP: 0010:power_saving_thread+0x313/0x411 [acpi_pad]
Code: 89 cd 48 89 d3 eb d1 48 c7 c7 55 70 72 c0 e8 64 86 b0 e4 c6 05 0d a1 02 00 01 e9 bc fd ff ff 45 89 e4 42 8b 04 a5 20 82 72 c0 <f0> 48 0f b3 05 f4 9c 01 00 42 c7 04 a5 20 82 72 c0 ff ff ff ff 31
RSP: 0018:ff72a5d51fa77ec8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000ffffffff RBX: ff462981e5d8cb80 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 0000000000000246
RBP: ff46297556959d80 R08: 0000000000000382 R09: ff46297c8d0f38d8
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 000000000000000e
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 000000000000000e
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff46297a800c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffe0740618 CR3: 0000007e20410004 CR4: 0000000000771ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 ? acpi_pad_add+0x120/0x120 [acpi_pad]
 kthread+0x10b/0x130
 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
        ...
CR2: ffffffffe0740618

crash> dis -lr ffffffffc0726923
        ...
/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./include/linux/cpumask.h: 114
0xffffffffc0726918 <power_saving_thread+776>:	mov    %r12d,%r12d
/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./include/linux/cpumask.h: 325
0xffffffffc072691b <power_saving_thread+779>:	mov    -0x3f8d7de0(,%r12,4),%eax
/usr/src/debug/kernel-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7/linux-4.18.0-425.19.2.el8_7.x86_64/./arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h: 80
0xffffffffc0726923 <power_saving_thread+787>:	lock btr %rax,0x19cf4(%rip)        # 0xffffffffc0740620 <pad_busy_cpus_bits>

crash> px tsk_in_cpu[14]
$66 = 0xffffffff

crash> px 0xffffffffc072692c+0x19cf4
$99 = 0xffffffffc0740620

crash> sym 0xffffffffc0740620
ffffffffc0740620 (b) pad_busy_cpus_bits [acpi_pad]

crash> px pad_busy_cpus_bits[0]
$42 = 0xfffc0
----------

To fix this, ensure that tsk_in_cpu[tsk_index] != -1 before calling
cpumask_clear_cpu() in exit_round_robin(), just as it is done in
round_robin_cpu().

Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
[ rjw: Subject edit, avoid updates to the same value ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Nobuhiro Iwamatsu (CIP) <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 687aa0c5581b8d4aa87fd92973e4ee576b550cdf ]

Transport assignment may race with module unload. Protect new_transport
from becoming a stale pointer.

This also takes care of an insecure call in vsock_use_local_transport();
add a lockdep assert.

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8056000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
RIP: 0010:vsock_assign_transport+0x366/0x600
Call Trace:
 vsock_connect+0x59c/0xc40
 __sys_connect+0xe8/0x100
 __x64_sys_connect+0x6e/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53

Fixes: c0cfa2d ("vsock: add multi-transports support")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michal Luczaj <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit c489f3283dbfc0f3c00c312149cae90d27552c45 ]

syzbot reported the splat below. [0]

This happens if we call ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) more than once.

During the first call, clip_mkip() sets clip_push() to vcc->push(),
and the second call copies it to clip_vcc->old_push().

Later, when the socket is close()d, vcc_destroy_socket() passes
NULL skb to clip_push(), which calls clip_vcc->old_push(),
triggering the infinite recursion.

Let's prevent the second ioctl(ATMARP_MKIP) by checking
vcc->user_back, which is allocated by the first call as clip_vcc.

Note also that we use lock_sock() to prevent racy calls.

[0]:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc9000d66fff8 (stack is ffffc9000d670000..ffffc9000d678000)
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5322 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc4-syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:clip_push+0x5/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:191
Code: e0 8f aa 8c e8 1c ad 5b fa eb ae 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 55 <41> 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 48 89 f3 49 89 fd 48 bd 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d670000 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 1ffff1100235a4a5 RBX: ffff888011ad2508 RCX: ffff8880003c0000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888037f01000
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffffff8fa104f7 R09: 1ffffffff1f4209e
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8a99b300 R12: ffffffff8a99b300
R13: ffff888037f01000 R14: ffff888011ad2500 R15: ffff888037f01578
FS:  000055557ab6d500(0000) GS:ffff88808d250000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffc9000d66fff8 CR3: 0000000043172000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200
 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200
 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200
...
 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200
 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200
 clip_push+0x6dc/0x720 net/atm/clip.c:200
 vcc_destroy_socket net/atm/common.c:183 [inline]
 vcc_release+0x157/0x460 net/atm/common.c:205
 __sock_release net/socket.c:647 [inline]
 sock_close+0xc0/0x240 net/socket.c:1391
 __fput+0x449/0xa70 fs/file_table.c:465
 task_work_run+0x1d1/0x260 kernel/task_work.c:227
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xec/0x110 kernel/entry/common.c:114
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:330 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work include/linux/entry-common.h:414 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode include/linux/entry-common.h:449 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x2bd/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7ff31c98e929
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fffb5aa1f78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001b4
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000012747 RCX: 00007ff31c98e929
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000001e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ff31cbb7ba0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000db5aa226f
R10: 00007ff31c7ff030 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ff31cbb608c
R13: 00007ff31cbb6080 R14: ffffffffffffffff R15: 00007fffb5aa2090
 </TASK>
Modules linked in:

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2371d94d248d126c1eb1
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
ztc1997 referenced this pull request in ztc1997/android_gki_kernel_5.10_common Sep 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit 22fc46cea91df3dce140a7dc6847c6fcf0354505 ]

atmarpd_dev_ops does not implement the send method, which may cause crash
as bellow.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5324 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6-syzkaller-00346-g5723cc3450bc #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:0x0
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0xffffffffffffffd6.
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d3cf778 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 1ffffffff1910dd1 RBX: 00000000000000c0 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: ffffc9000dc82000 RSI: ffff88803e4c4640 RDI: ffff888052cd0000
RBP: ffffc9000d3cf8d0 R08: ffff888052c9143f R09: 1ffff1100a592287
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff92001a79f00
R13: ffff888052cd0000 R14: ffff88803e4c4640 R15: ffffffff8c886e88
FS:  00007fbc762566c0(0000) GS:ffff88808d6c2000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 0000000041f1b000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 vcc_sendmsg+0xa10/0xc50 net/atm/common.c:644
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x219/0x270 net/socket.c:727
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x52d/0x830 net/socket.c:2566
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21f/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2620
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x227/0x430 net/socket.c:2709
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2736 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2733 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xc0 net/socket.c:2733
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]>
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